St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 53

Number 2

Article 1

5-26-2022

The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, A Hard Look at Penumbral
Rights and Cost/Benefit Balancing Tests
Joshua J. Schroeder

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law and Philosophy
Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Joshua J. Schroeder, The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I, A Hard Look at Penumbral Rights and Cost/
Benefit Balancing Tests, 53 ST. MARY'S L.J. 323 (2022).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process – Part I

ARTICLE
THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART I
A HARD LOOK AT PENUMBRAL RIGHTS AND
COST/BENEFIT BALANCING TESTS
JOSHUA J. SCHROEDER*

A.
B.
C.

Abstract .................................................................................................. 324
Foreword: The Problem of Inherent Human Insanity ................... 325
Introduction: The Problem of Rationalized Legal Paradoxes........ 332
A Definition of “Due” that Inspired Justice Holmes and
Adolf Hitler ............................................................................................ 337
How Penumbral Rights Theory Confounded Feudal, Canon,
and Common Law ................................................................................ 355
How the Reconstruction Court Inspired Justice Powell to
Resurrect Buck v. Bell............................................................................. 370
Conclusion of The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I ............................. 385

* Joshua J. Schroeder is owner and founder of SchroederLaw in Oakland, California, where he
practices immigration law, constitutional law, and intellectual property law. He holds a J.D. from
Lewis & Clark Law School, and is admitted to practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon, the State Bar of California, and the Oregon State Bar.
This series is dedicated to my friendships with Angela Klein, PhD, and Jon Patterson, Esq. whose
conversations with me over the years kept me sane enough to author this project.

323

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

324

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

This is Part I of a three-part series known as “ The Dark Side of Due Process,”
published in the St. Mary’s Law Journal. Parts II and III will follow this Article in
consecutive issues of this volume of the St. Mary’s Law Journal. An Abstract and
Foreword for this project are printed at the beginning of Part I, and a general conclusion
is printed at the end of Part III.
ABSTRACT
Due process is the fountainhead of legitimate government coercion. When an
individual’s rights of life, liberty, or property are at stake, the government is meant to
apply due process of the law or suffer reversal of its intrusions as a plain trespass.
However, such reversals are merely theoretical, premised upon the willingness of federal
judges to interpose their power for the protection of ordinary individuals.
The willingness of federal jurists to check the other branches of government for
individual rights is transient at best. They do not usually check the global, dragnet United
States surveillance programs that clearly violate the holding in Kyllo v. United States.
Prophylactic measures like Miranda warnings and the exclusionary rule have proven mere
symbols of contradiction and irony.
Whenever our institutions appear to be overrun with injustice, well-meaning lawyers
always seem to suggest that a Mathews balancing test could solve everything. The
seductive belief that a utopia lies just on the other side of a balancing test confirms our
doom under the ironies of panoptic Benthamism. As Justice Brennan argued, in dissent
of Mathews’ sister case Stone v. Powell, the new cost/benefit balancing tests could be
a mere “garb” to add an air of respectability to judicial error.
Justice Powell, the author of Mathews and Stone, was himself a trained Bernaysian
propagandist. While on the bench, Powell’s public relations agenda seemed to favor the
normalization of injustice through cost/benefit due process ideologies. If Justice Brennan
searched a little further into the claims Justice Powell made about the Lochner era, he
might have exposed Mathews even more effectively. For it appears that Mathews
balancing tests were derived from Buck v. Bell and eugenic pseudo-science.
Despite an aversion to the darkness, this project does not seek to excoriate the dark
side of due process. Rather, like Goethe’s Faust, it positions a listening ear in the
direction of dark spaces. The aim of this project is to illuminate the substance of
penumbral rights and cost/benefit balancing tests—especially their role in systems of
oppression. The intended result will be a foothold for seekers of justice in one of our
darkest eras yet.
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FOREWORD: THE PROBLEM OF INHERENT HUMAN INSANITY
In 1793, as Madame Roland was dragged off to the guillotine to have her
head removed, she adopted a Thomas Paine-ism and cried out: “O my
friends! may propitious fate conduct you to the United States, the only
asylum of freedom!”1 In the era of present-day common sense, the word
“asylum” conjures the image of a mental institution.2 This new connotation
seems to fit the cautionary tale of Madame Roland well because when the
French listened to American Rationalists in 1793, they began chopping off
their own heads.3
Speaking of America, James Baldwin once remarked “Black people . . .
were the first psychiatrists here.”4 It was, therefore, auspicious that James
Baldwin chose to inhabit France while diagnosing America’s worst
psychoses because it is possible that a black man like Baldwin might also be
able to explain why France was so deluded by the announcement of

1. MARIE-JEANNE ROLAND DE LA PLATIÈRE, THE PRIVATE MEMOIRS OF MADAME ROLAND
113–14 (Edward Gilpin Johnson ed., 3d. ed. 1901). See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 32 (1776)
[hereinafter PAINE, COMMON] (“O ye that love mankind; ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny,
stand forth; every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round
the globe. Asia and Africa, have long expelled her[]—Europe regards her like a stranger, and England
hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.”);
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: PART I 82 n.* (2d ed., 1791) [hereinafter PAINE, RIGHTS] (referring
to the French “UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE, AND UNIVERSAL RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP” as an
expansion upon the limited “asylum” that was offered in England at that time).
2. ROLAND, supra note 1, at 113–14.
3. See ROLAND, supra note 1, at 113 (remarking on the great number of people killed by the
French authorities); cf. Gary Kates, From Liberalism to Radicalism: Tom Paine’s Rights of Man, 50 J. HIST.
IDEAS 569, 585–86 (1989) (discussing the contrast between the two parts of Thomas’s Paine’s Rights of
Man); Joshua J. Schroeder, Leviathan Goes to Washington: How to Assert the Separation of Powers in Defense of
Future Generations, 15 FLA. A&M U.L. REV. 1, 223–24 (2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, Leviathan]
(examining how the American Revolution was premised on “counter-rationalist principles”).
America’s other most notable Rationalists, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, both sent treatises to
France in hopes they might influence the French Revolution. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON VIRGINIA (1785) (responding to French inquiries about the State of Virginia); 1–3 JOHN ADAMS,
A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(1794) [hereinafter ADAMS, A DEFENCE] (responding to a letter written by the French economist
Turgot and published in France). But see JOHN HECTOR ST. JOHN CRÈVECŒUR, LETTERS FROM AN
AMERICAN FARMER (1904) (demonstrating that some tracts claiming to represent American
Rationalism did not come from Americans, because Crèvecœur published these fictional letters as if
he were still an American farmer, when he actually was a counterrevolutionary French Comte who
abandoned his American farm to burn, left his American wife to die, and his American children to
grow up orphaned, all so he could flee America for the comforts of French court).
4. JAMES BALDWIN, THE CROSS OF REDEMPTION: UNCOLLECTED WRITINGS 79 (Randall
Kenan ed., 2010) [hereinafter BALDWIN, THE CROSS].
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American freedom in 1776 that it seemed to self-destruct.5 From his haven
in France, Baldwin strongly disputed American racism—a reality every bit
as insane as the French Terror and much longer-lasting.6
Baldwin’s literary contemporary, Flannery O’Connor, grew up near
Georgia’s central insane asylum, and she gave us striking material to consider
regarding American insanity.7 O’Connor began her career with this prayer:
“Dear Lord please . . . give us some kind of weapon, not to defend us from
them [i.e., the psychologists] but to defend us from ourselves after they have
got through with us.”8 O’Connor came of age in the county where Leo M.
Frank, a party in Frank v. Mangum,9 was held in prison before being
lynched—a tale as gruesome in its facts as the French Terror, and as
inspiring for gothic prose.10
In mid-20th century America, it was clear to both O’Connor and Baldwin
that a racial reckoning was due.11 This reckoning began its progress in
earnest on Bloody Sunday in Selma, Alabama.12 Baldwin hoped that as a
5. See id., at 136 (“It bears terrifying witness to what happened to everyone who got here, and
paid the price of the ticket. The price was to become ‘white.’ No one was white before he/she came
to America. It took generations, and a vast amount of coercion, before this became a white
country . . . . White men—from Norway for example, where they were “Norwegians”—became white
by slaughtering the cattle, poisoning the wells, torching the houses, massacring Native Americans,
raping black women.”); cf. 1 THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: RACIAL
OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 17–18, 23, 28 (2012) (naming the events and laws that invented
the white race, as well as locating its invention in America: “The pivotal events are seen to be Bacon’s
Rebellion in 1676 and the 1705 revision of the Virginia laws, in particular, the ‘Act concerning Servants
and Slaves’”).
6. See JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 89 (2021) [hereinafter BALDWIN, THE FIRE]
(explaining Baldwin’s occupation and the reason he moved to France from the United States).
7. Doug Monroe, Asylum: Inside Central State Hospital, Once the World’s Largest Mental Institution,
ATLANTA (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/asylum-inside-centralstate-hospital-worlds-largest-mental-institution [https://perma.cc/3Q5C-MCW3] (“Mab Segrest, a
visiting scholar . . . explored the hospital’s impact on the fiction of author Flannery O’Connor, who
lived just seven miles from the asylum.”).
8. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, A PRAYER JOURNAL 15–16 (2013) [hereinafter O’CONNOR,
A PRAYER].
9. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
10. Id. at 311–12; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure,
99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 58 (2000) (“Frank was then seized by a mob from the state prison farm at
Milledgeville and taken back to Marietta, where he was lynched.”).
11. BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 78–79; FLANNERY O’CONNOR, Everything that Rises
Must Converge (1961), reprinted in EVERYTHING THAT RISES MUST CONVERGE 20–23 (1965)
[hereinafter O’CONNOR, EVERYTHING]; cf. 1 ALLEN, supra note 5, at 17–18, 23 (noting that such
reckonings in America trace back at least as far as Bacon’s Rebellion).
12. SELMA (Paramount Pictures 2014). Under Ava DuVernay’s direction, this movie remains
the most true-to-fact depiction of the events of Bloody Sunday. Id.
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result of facing our racism, Americans might “descend deeper than [we]
have ever before descended” into the contemplation of the insanity that
besets us as we prepare to scale our “highest mountain” of racial and gender
equality and equity.13
Rising at Baldwin’s call, this Article proceeds to descend deep into
darkness, armed with only the kind of flawed hope generated by Tarwater’s
prophesy in O’Connor’s second novel: “Go warn the children of God of
the terrible speed of mercy.”14 Our best hope is only a flawed kind of virtue
rising from tar-waters.15 Accepting the flaws of human virtue is, if we
believe O’Connor and Baldwin’s prognoses, essential to our eventual
success.16
Prior to the founding of the United States, the Puritans rejected flawed,
human virtues and embraced the Platonic pursuit of perfection,17 which
became central to Hobbes’s rational theory of inherent human madness.18
From it, notable American Hegelians, including Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., theorized about humanity’s rational

13. BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 78.
14. FLANNERY O’CONNOR, THE VIOLENT BEAR IT AWAY 242 (1960) [hereinafter
O’CONNOR, THE VIOLENT].
15. Id.
16. See id. (EP); BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 34 (“Not everything that is faced can be
changed; but nothing can be changed until it is faced.”); see also YaleCourses, 3. Flannery O’Connor,
Wise Blood, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjplQUPhES4 [https://
perma.cc/HS5L-DWCG] (lecturing on Flannery O’Connor’s Wise Blood, Yale Professor Amy
Hungerford demonstrated O’Connor’s devout belief that, regardless of her characters’ imperfections,
“the concerns of the transcendent are seeping their way into the concerns of the material world
below”).
17. See HENRY MORE, Psychodia Platonica 73 [1642] (presenting a vision of Puritanical perfection
inspired by Platonic Rationalism throughout; for example, speaking of human reason as “a light far
brighter [than the Sun]! . . . As that light doth the Sun. So perfect clear[,] [s]o perfect pure it is, that
outward eye”); Frank A. Doggett, Donne’s Platonism, 42 SEWANEE REV. 274, 275 (1934). Cf. Claudia
D. Johnson, Hawthorne and Nineteenth-Century Perfectionism, 44 AM. LITERATURE 585, 586–87 (1973)
(examining the puritanical obsession with perfection that inspired Nathaniel Hawthorne in nineteenthcentury America); RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES 241 (1850) [hereinafter
EMERSON, FIRST SERIES] (quoting Henry More, Psychodia Platonica 21 [1642]).
18. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 46–4 (explaining his concept of “Madnesse”); Id. at 268
(comparing himself to Plato for using the imperfections of government as the basis for perfecting it);
Robert Lamb, The Paradox of System Builders: Plato and Hobbes, 40 SOC. RSCH. 708, 709 (1973) (comparing
Hobbes and Plato); cf. Patricia Springborg, Hobbes, Donne and the Virginia Company: Terra Nullius and ‘The
Bulimia of Dominium’, 36 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 113, 158–60 (2013) (noting Hobbes’s use of the
imperfection in the Puritan government, including the imperfection evident in the Jamestown
massacre, to pivot his thinking towards the creation of the most perfect government possible, i.e., an
absolute monarchy, as a bulwark against the inevitable dangers of human insanity).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

328

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

double-consciousness.19 However, none of these Hegelians managed to
rise with the marvelous elocution of the founding poetess Phillis Wheatley,
who resisted Hobbes’s conclusion of inherent human “Madnesse.”20
Thomas Hobbes taught his students how to manipulate others by
defining terms so that certain desired conclusions were forced.21 For
example, Hobbes theorized that all humans experience pride and dejection
as the same emotional experience, ergo all humans are inherently insane,
ergo all humans need to be ruled by absolute kings.22 In other words,

19. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48 (asserting inherent human insanity because of the
duality of human pride and dejection), exemplified in John Milton, Samson Agonistes 532–40 [1671]
(commenting on Samson’s pride as his downfall). See Christopher N. Warren, When Self-Preservation
Bids: Approaching Milton, Hobbes, and Dissent, 37 ENG. LITERARY RENAISSANCE 118, 119–20, 130, 139
(2007); REGINALD A. WILBURN, PREACHING THE GOSPEL OF BLACK REVOLT: APPROPRIATING
MILTON IN EARLY AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE 20–21, 171–72 (2014) (identifying Milton as
the origin of black ideas of revolt and revolution in America, especially pointing to Milton’s terroristic
tract Samson Agonistes); Joel Porte, Emerson, Thoreau, and the Double Consciousness, 41 NEW ENG. Q. 40, 42
(1968) (discussing Emerson’s treatment of dual consciousness); Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes’s
Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. REV. 703, 706, 722 (1992) (noting how Holmes was “strongly influenced by
Hegel”); SANDRA ADELL, DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS/DOUBLE BIND 13–15 (1994) (treating W.E.B.
Du Bois as subscribing to Hegel); cf. James A. Good, A “World-Historical Idea”: The St. Louis Hegelians
and the Civil War, 34 J. AM. STUD. 447, 448 (2000) (noting Emerson’s strong interest in Hegelianism);
BERTRAND RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 20 (1921) [hereinafter RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR] (“Hegel’s
philosophy is so odd that one would not have expected him to be able to get sane men to accept it,
but he did. He set it out with so much obscurity that people thought it must be profound. It can quite
easily be expounded lucidly in words of one syllable, but then its absurdity becomes obvious.”).
20. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48, 70 (comparing humanity to Prometheus as a figure of
perpetual fear at the bottom of human psychology), refuted by Phillis Wheatley, An Hymn to Humanity
[1773] (implicitly comparing Prometheus to Jesus Christ as a champion of humankind against the
vengeance of the gods), as expounded in Joshua J. Schroeder, We Will All Be Free or None Will Be:
Why Federal Power is not Plenary, but Limited and Supreme, 27 TEX. HISP. J. L. POL’Y 1, 67–68 (2021)
[hereinafter Schroeder, We Will].
21. See Frederick G. Whelan, Language and Its Abuses in Hobbes’ Political Philosophy, 75 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 59, 60, 73 (1981) (explaining Hobbes’s theory of language). As an advocate of strong
government censorship of language, Thomas Hobbes appeared to be the proto-gaslighter. HOBBES,
supra note 18, at 46–48, 70, 118 (asserting that humankind is inherently insane to justify absolute
monarchy). But see Kenji Yoshino, Acts of Oblivion, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 65–72 (2020)
(appearing to side with Thomas Hobbes, a gaslighter-in-the-extreme, against the Indemnity and
Oblivion Act (1660) as if the English government’s choosing to forget the collective trauma after their
Civil War, for the purposes of staying most (but not all) punishments, is a form of gaslighting).
22. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48, 118; cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY xxii (1945) [hereinafter RUSSELL, A HISTORY] (noting that “Hobbes, Rousseau, and
Hegel” reacted to “the more insane forms of subjectivism in modern times,” with ideologies that
amounted “to absolute authority and blind subservience to tradition[,]” and that “their doctrines are
embodied practically in Cromwell, Napoleon, and modern Germany,” i.e., Hitler).
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Hobbes premised his entire political theory on the idea that humanity is
incapable of humility.23
Hobbes believed that from the contradictory emotions of pride and
dejection sprang thoughts and deeds that inevitably lifted
kings into absolute power.24 All that remained was for prideful and dejected
humanity to embody the overwhelming power of Leviathan to establish
absolute monarchies in their image.25 Of all Hobbes’s votaries,
Hegel was probably the most effective at spreading Hobbesianism to
America,26 where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. eventually built his
“bad man” theory of law upon it.27 With Holmes in Buck v.
23. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 232 (rejecting the idea that government form should be
decided by ordinary human beings, in part, because of their lack of humility).
24. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 118 (noting that humanity is inherently prideful and dejected);
id. at 231 (claiming that humanity’s “Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himself[]
to Government,” and suggesting that Leviathan is the proper form of government for humanity, a “King
of all the children of pride”).
25. See Norman Jacobson, The Strange Case of the Hobbesian Man, 63 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 1–2
(1998) (describing the frontispiece of Hobbe’s Leviathan).
26. Good, supra note 19, at 448 (describing the initial American embrace of Hegelianism);
Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 93, 94–99 (2011)
(demonstrating the enduring hold of Hegelian thought in the United States as exemplified by the
pervasiveness of Professor Margaret Jane Radin’s publications in the U.S. legal academy). See Patrick
Riley, Hegel on Consent and Social-Contract Theory: Does He “Cancel and Preserve” the Will?, 26 WESTERN POL.
Q. 130, 146–47 (1973) (noting Hegel’s embrace and reiteration of Hobbesian philosophy).
Cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 738–40 (noting the clear procession from Hobbes to Hegel,
but with a lighter hand about giving Hobbes the credit for state-worship ideologies, and that Hegel
thought “that America is the land of the future, ‘where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the
world’s history shall reveal itself—perhaps [he adds characteristically] in a contest between North and
South America.’ He seems to think that everything important takes the form of war. If it were
suggested to him that the contribution of America to world history might be the development of a
society without extreme poverty, he would not be interested. On the contrary, he says that, as yet,
there is no real State in America, because a real State requires a division of classes into rich and poor.”).
27. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
[hereinafter Holmes, Jr., The Path] (claiming that the law was more than a mere Hegelian dream);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 42, 206–11 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, JR.]
(citing Hegel liberally to justify his departure from the theories of freedom and justice given in the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights); see also Novick, supra note 19, at 706 (noting the
Hegelian influence in which Holmes’ ideas were developed); Stanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin,
The “Bad Man,” The Good, and the Self-Reliant, 78 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1998) (using Ralph Waldo
Emerson as a key to understanding Holmes’ Path of the Law); Christopher L. Sagers, Monism, Nominalism,
and Public-Private in the Work of Margaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 244 (2006) (comparing
Radin’s Hegelianism to Holmes’ “bad-man prediction of what courts will do”). But see Marco Jimenez,
Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069, 2126 (2011) (distinguishing Holmes’
philosophy from Hegelianism); Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User’s Manual, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1735,
1767 (1989) (interpreting Holmes’ philosophy as a rejection of Hegel); id. at 1785 n.237, 1794 (revealing
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Bell,28 America exemplified Hobbesian madness in the tyrannical style of
Nurse Ratched.29
Eugenics ideology itself is pervaded by a “bad man” theory of law.30 This
theory of law, which encourages judges to depart from common law stare
decisis, is premised on the idea that judges are categorically resistant to
Hobbesian insanity.31 However, in the latter half of the 20th century, the
how Holmes’ apparent rejection of Hegel could be “aufgehoben” in the sense of Hegelian sublation
“aufhebung,” in which case Holmes both canceled and preserved Hegel). Cf. Margeret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 975 n.62 (1982) (stating concepts that are “aufgehoben”
“are at once destroyed, transcended, and incorporated into a new synthesis”); see RUSSELL, A HISTORY,
supra note 22, at 733–34 (explaining Hegelian aufgehoben ideology in the sanest possible way).
28. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (“It would be strange if [the government]
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the [s]tate for these lesser sacrifices, often
not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) [hereinafter Holmes, Natural
Law] (“The most fundamental of the supposed preexisting rights—the right to life—is sacrificed
without a scruple not only in war, but whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant
power in the community, is thought to demand it. Whether that interest is the interest of mankind in
the long run no one can tell, and as, in any event, to those who do not think with Kant and Hegel it is
only an interest, the sanctity disappears.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law,
12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 445–47, 449 (1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Law in Science] (adopting Social
Darwinism as his central common law principle, but this was not the common law either in England
or America—it was, rather, a “survival” of Hobbesian feudalism in modern times).
29. See Angel of Mercy: Nurse Ratched 11:34 (Netflix 2020); Kimberly Bond, Ratched: From
Lobotomies to Hydrotherapy, the Sinister Truths Behind the Sarah Paulson Netflix Series, EVENING STANDARD
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.standard.co.uk/culture/tvfilm/ratched-netflix-treatments-true-storya4558656.html [https://perma.cc/K8GM-4VRK]; see also BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:15:41 (Erika Cohn
dir., 2020) (showing California Department of Corrections OB Nurse as stating, “[T]he ideal time to
do it to them is when you’re already in there. It just takes a couple more minutes and then a couple
more snips.”).
30. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 205–06 (applying Holmes’ bad man theory of law by closing up
loopholes that defective-persons-as-bad-men may exploit to do mischief: “[M]any defective persons
who[,] if now discharged[,] would become a menace[,] but[,] if incapable of procreating[,] might be
discharged with safety”); Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 457–59 (believing that judges could foretell
the future in the style of eugenic theory was essential to Holmes’ idea of the law) cf. HARRY H.
LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 328 (1922) (recording
Hon. F. W. Hatch, General Superintendent of State Hospitals in Sacramento, California, as saying,
“It is not necessary to determine whether ‘any given convict is a member of a[] hereditary criminal
group’ in order to show that the prevention of his procreating will be preventive of crime”).
31. See Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 457–59 (explaining the bad man theory is prophesy;
it is necessarily future oriented, rather than focused on keeping the promises common law made in the
past, which is known as common law stare decisis—Holmes’ estimation of the bad man’s future behavior
depends upon the bad man’s inherent ability to reason summed up here: “If you want to know the law
and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”). This is a colorful way of relying
upon the rational theory of utilitarianism such that, if humans cannot reliably foretell what action will
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Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
explained how humans, including judges, may believe so strongly in their
own inherent rationality that they could embrace a panoptic version of
Hobbesian madness rather than the ordinary judicial pursuits of truth and
justice.32
Flannery O’Connor demonstrated how American Rationalists, like Faust,
failing to find perfection in the light, plunged themselves ever deeper into
the shadows.33 James Baldwin stood at perhaps the opposite pole of the
American experience; ordering us to face what we have become and hoping
that by acknowledging our irrational behavior, we might learn to do better.34
Using James Baldwin and Flannery O’Connor as special guides, this threepart series will take a hard look at the dark side of due process as follows:
(I) A Hard Look at Penumbral Rights and Cost/Benefit Balancing Tests;
(II) Why Penumbral Rights and Cost/Benefit Balancing Tests are Bad; and
(III) How to Use Irreverent Double-Talk to Speak Back to Bad Men.

benefit them, such Rational theories do not hold together and cannot serve Holmes’ project of
deciphering the law. Id.
32. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT 261, 267, 272–78, 324–27 (2021) (summarizing
Kahneman & Tversky’s research and noting that economists “‘felt that we are right and at the same
time they wished we weren’t because the replacement of utility theory by the model we outlined would
cause them no end of problems’”—statement of Amos Tversky); see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW 377–78, 381 (2011) (debunking Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism by showing that
human beings are incapable of rationally pursuing happiness and avoiding pain, and showing how the
delusion that humans can reliably predict pain and pleasure is linked to measurable flaws in our ability
to remember experiences accurately); 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON 2–3 (1791); Maryland v.
King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic
panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have
been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”); cf. James E. Crimmins, Bentham and Hobbes:
An Issue of Influence, 63 J. OF HIST. OF IDEAS 677, 685–88 (2002).
33. See FLANNERY O’CONNOR, WISE BLOOD 228 (2007) [hereinafter O’CONNOR, WISE];
Flannery O’Connor, The Lame Shall Enter First (1962), in O’CONNOR, EVERYTHING, supra note 11
at 190 (“[T]he child hung in the jungle of shadows, just below the beam from which he had launched
his flight into space.”); cf. Edward Rothstein, CONNECTIONS; Faust Learns the Painful Truth: Perfection
Is Not for the Having, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/13/arts/
connections-faust-learns-the-painful-truth-perfection-is-not-for-the-having.html [https://perma.cc/
66YF-L8VF]
34. See BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 34 (“Not everything that is faced can be changed;
but nothing can be changed until it is faced.”); id. at 78 (“Let me force you, or try to force you, to
observe a paradox.”).
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF RATIONALIZED LEGAL PARADOXES
To paraphrase Judge Bork: Who says Mathews must say Buck.35
Unfortunately, like Powell in Mathews, most judges tend to have a blind spot
for their own contradictions.36 As a result, federal courts continue to apply
Holmes’ “bad man” ideology to issue paradoxical decisions like
Karingithi v. Whitaker, for example, which endorsed an oxymoron of illegal
jurisdiction in Immigration Court.37
35. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 429 n.309 (2011) (quoting ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 (1990))
(“Who says Roe must say Lochner and Scott.”) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 (1990)). But see id. at 462 n.554 (2011) (stating
Buck was “better known for the shock value of particular phrases in associated opinions than for their
contested application of an otherwise acceptable legal norm”). Roe actually cited Buck as good law, and
yet Bork’s theory alleging a re-legitimization of Lochner was only cited as a theory in Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154–55 (1973) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)) (limiting
a woman’s right to seek an abortion by citing to Buck, and extending a cost/benefits balancing approach
saying, “[A]t some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal
life, become dominant.”). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (decided after Roe, and
upon the same theory of balancing the interests of the state versus individual). As addressed below,
infra notes 52–55, Roe’s penumbral theory originally stemmed from Justice Brandeis’ Buck-inspired
dissent in Olmstead that was extended in Griswold v. Connecticut. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 494 (1965) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citing to Buck on page 472 of Olmstead))
36. Mathews hailed itself as a vindication of due process in the same breath that it disclaimed any
meaningful judicial review of due process, and ever since it has been used in several attempts to
vindicate due process only to fall into sheer irony. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (establishing threefactor due process analysis), extended by Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion);
Dahlia Lithwick, Nevermind: Hamdi Wasn’t So Bad After All, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2004, 5:37 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/hamdi-wasn-t-so-bad-after-all.html [https://perma.cc
/79B6-GTAQ] [hereinafter Lithwick, Nevermind] (noting the Supreme Court’s confusing due process
jurisprudence was futile anyway); see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340–41 (2014) (using
Mathews to paper over whatever process was given as “due” process); cf. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR,
THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 150 (2002) [hereinafter
O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY] (speaking of Justice Powell: “For those who seek a model of human
kindness, decency, exemplary behavior, and integrity, there will never be a better man”).
37. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2019) (existing as one of several
similar circuit court decisions on the same topic, focusing on the bad man view of law, which is second
nature in United States courts, in which the court closes loopholes in the law that individuals may use
to their benefit, while actively creating a giant loophole for the government by allowing defective NTAs
(Notices to Appear) to vest jurisdiction because they are somehow also non-jurisdictional); see also
8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(b) (stating that NTA’s are jurisdictional charging documents ordinarily cited for
jurisdiction by Immigration Judges); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (requiring legal NTA’s to include “[t]he
time and place at which the proceedings will be held[]”); cf. Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 401 (9th Cir.
2019) (“[N]either we nor DHS can override the clear statutory command that time and place
information be included in all Notices to Appear.”); id. at 405 (distinguishing Karingithi for the
oxymoron of holding that “a defective Notice to Appear vests the Immigration Court with
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Another example was Iqbal and Twombly, which together confirmed
Holmes’ Hegelian vision for the common law as a way to make the ends
justify the means.38 Like the Court’s definition of plausible, between
possible and probable,39 Holmes liked to stare into the mystical space
between two extremes to pull out a magical third option from the
penumbra.40 This process is whence Holmes originally drew his concept
of “due” process in Buck v. Bell.41
In Buck, Justice Holmes held that factual determinations of executive
agents are implicitly unchallengeable in court.42 He furthermore held that
as long as the legally prescribed procedure is followed in reviewing those

jurisdiction”—i.e., that an illegal NTA can vest proper jurisdiction); Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F.4th
351, 355 (5th Cir. 2021); Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N Dec. 425, 436 (BIA 2022) (contending that
“Rodriguez does not apply here because this case arises in the First Circuit”). The circuit courts offer
several examples of a Hegelian sleight of hand in virtually every topic of law. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l,
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (rendering one of the most unintelligible passages
in U.S. legal history in a distinct, Hegelian style: “The difference between actual and red flag knowledge
is thus not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an
objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider
actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on whether
the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement
‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”—this is unintelligible).
38. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (stating the plausibility standard under
Twombly as “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience”);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ( “[we do not require heightened fact pleading
of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”—seeming to
say, in Hegelian style, that the plausibility standard is both not heightened and heightened). See Henry
S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial
Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 857–58 (2012) (“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience.”) (quoting HOLMES, JR., supra note 27, at 1); cf. ANON., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41077,
CIVIL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS AFTER BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION V. TWOMBLY AND
ASHCROFT V. IQBAL 5 (2010) (“Interpretations of Twombly differed among the lower federal courts.
Some interpreted the decision as having introduced a general heightened pleading standard, while
others viewed the holding as more limited . . . . Among legal commentators, a consensus seemed to
emerge that despite containing some language to the contrary, the ruling creates a general heightened
pleading standard.”).
39. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the Plausibility
Standard after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 529 (2009)
(“A plausible inference is more than merely possible, but not as strong as a probable inference.”).
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable . . . .”); id. at 561 (rejecting the old idea that claims should
proceed as long as they could be supported by possible facts).
40. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 457.
41. Id.; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
42. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
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determinations, “the plaintiff at error has due process at law.”43 Only after
making both these holdings did Buck say that an ad hoc cost/benefit
balancing test can be extended to potentially paper over any given process
as “due.”44
According to Holmes, costs and benefits are two extremes between
which the Court is tasked to draw a bright line.45 Justice Powell
rehabilitated this strategy in Stone and Mathews so that potentially any process
may be considered “due” process.46 Powell, and those who employed his
Bernaysian strategies that were originally derived from the Puritan concept
of due process to legitimize Cromwellian terrorism,47 hoped the public
would not notice that balancing tests only required judges to confirm an
appearance that the benefits outweighed the costs.48
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)) (extending the Jacobson
cost/benefit rationale used to affirm state vaccine mandates); cf. Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell:
A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 101, 114 (2011) [hereinafter Nourse,
Buck] (“Holmes . . . believed that the Constitution could be reduced to ad hoc balancing.”).
45. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; see also Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24 (“[T]hey generally have considered
the risk of such an injury too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits . . . .”).
46. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488–89 (1976) (discussing a cost-benefit analysis of
impeachment using illegally seized evidence); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 349 (1976)
(“We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits,
and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process.”).
47. Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
on the Attack on American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971), https://www.greenpeace.org/
usa/democracy/the-lewis-powell-memo-a-corporate-blueprint-to-dominate-democracy/
[https://
perma.cc/V3QD-9LHU] [hereinafter Powell Memo]. See EDWARD BERNAYS, PUBLIC RELATIONS
20–29 (1945) [hereinafter BERNAYS, PUBLIC]; EDWARD L. BERNAYS, THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA
epigraph (1965) [hereinafter BERNAYS, THE BIOGRAPHY] (quoting John Milton, Samson Agonistes
865–68 [1671]) (quoting Milton, “That grounded maxim / So rife and celebrated in the mouths /
Of wisest men; that to the public good / Private respects must yield” and containing references to the
Puritans’ free use of the printing press to manipulate the people of England in order to justify
propaganda as legitimate free speech); John Milton, Samson Agonistes preface [1671] (invoking the
“power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such like passions, that is[,]
to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stir[ed] up by reading or seeing those
passions well imitated”); YaleCourses, 23. Samson Agonistes, YOUTUBE 17:46–17:56 (Nov. 23, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JBYnHy6YxOU [https://perma.cc/L9K8-BWER] [(stating,
“Samson Agonistes is the intensest . . . expression of misogyny that you will find in the Miltonic Canon,”
and also noting in several places that Samson Agonistes expresses sexual violence, akin to the violence
permitted by Buck v. Bell, like mass castrations of gentiles and the idea that Dalila essentially castrated
Samson through marriage, thereby justifying his revenge, i.e., a genocide of the Philistines through a
righteous suicide by Samson in the end).
48. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 475–76 n.7–9, 493 n.35 (extensively referencing a false history of
habeas corpus supported by Paul M. Bator’s article Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners to justify denying habeas corpus to state prisoners through cost/benefit balancing tests
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Federal judges do not usually confirm the actual costs and benefits of
their Mathews decisions, because Stone and Mathews are completely
superficial.49 In these decisions, Justice Powell adopted Professor
Paul Bator’s relativistic fatalism, which dispensed with the ordinary judicial
pursuits of truth and justice.50 In Stone, it was deemed sufficient for the
mere appearance of truth and justice to control federal judicial policy
according to a cost/benefit balancing test; in other words, as long as judges
appeared to be good it did not matter if they participated in bad.51
This signified the fact that, by the time Mathews rolled around,
Justice Holmes’ holdings in Buck were second nature.52 All that remained
after adopting Holmes’ legal presuppositions, as presented in Buck and
Lochner, was a better description of cost/benefit balancing tests, which
Mathews clarified.53 The Mathews test, first eclipsed by its sister case Stone v.
for the first time); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (requiring federal courts to consider “the probable value, if
any, of additional procedural safeguards” rather than the basic question of whether equal justice is
served by existing legal process); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 448 n.12 (1963) (arguing that the appearance of truth is the best
that trials can accomplish); id. at 455, 487 (suggesting that federal habeas courts consider merely
whether “a reasoned probability that justice was done, rather than whether in some ultimate sense the
truth was in fact found”); id. at 524–26 (naming “the appearance of fairness” as a sufficient
legitimization of his theories); see generally Eric M. Freedman, Brown v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus
Revolution that Wasn’t, 5 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000).
49. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340–41 (2014) (using Mathews to paper over
whatever process was given as “due” process writing: “If the question in a pre-trial forfeiture case is
whether there is probable cause to think the defendant committed the crime alleged, then the answer
is: whatever the grand jury decides”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (citing Mathews to paper over military trials for United States citizens as “due” process stating
that “the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal”—notably the Hamdi Court emphasized the superficial nature of both
Mathews and Stone when it cited Mathews, a non-habeas case, and not Stone, a habeas case).
50. See supra notes 48–48; Freedman, supra note 48, at 1545 n.9 (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)) (explaining Bator’s influence over
Justice Powell and others). I discussed Bator’s influence over the post-Fay v. Noia Court in my article
The Body Snatchers, which responded to Bator’s position that federal judges should obstruct access to
de novo review of habeas claims as long as it appears to the public that justice was probably served, and
noting that Stone’s approach was an enigma in habeas corpus jurisprudence at the time it was decided.
Joshua J. Schroeder, The Body Snatchers: How the Writ of Habeas Corpus was Taken from the People of the United
States, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 31 n.160, 32 n.173, 100, 105–07 (2016) [hereinafter Schroeder,
The Body].
51. See supra notes 48–50.
52. See Mathews,424 U.S. at 334–35 (citing several “prior decisions” that applied something
similar to Mathews balancing to questions of due process).
53. Id. at 334–35. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”)); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,
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Powell,54 eventually outgrew Stone to touch potentially every corner of
American law to answer the question of “what process is due.”55
Holmes’ version of due process was not “of the law,” because his
definition of “law” was a literal prophecy, i.e., a guess about what the law
may be in the future.56 Holmes judged the law by what future lawbreakers
would think they could do without consequence.57 He adopted the strategy
of bad men who try to secure their futures with perfect crimes as his own—
a legal ideology Hannah Arendt called “logicality” that, as she observed, led
directly to the holocaust.58
Using what bad people may think they can get away with in the future as
if it were the law explains the Buck/Mathews framework.59 It explains how
the court, inspired as it was by The Slaughterhouse Cases, opened a back door
to Star Chambers in America on a utilitarian basis.60 And it explains why
J., dissenting) (“The other day, we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination law.”) (referencing
Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24 (“[T]hey generally have considered the risk of such an
injury too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits.”) cf. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products
Revisited, 82 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982) (Justice Powell spread several theories about
“the passing of the Lochner era,” and constantly implied that Justice Holmes decided Lochner correctly,
but this did not move the Court past Buck v. Bell, which could be read as extremely similar to West Coast
Hotel Company v. Parrish for upholding a state law that especially concerned women’s health).
54. See, e.g., Sam Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the Arguably
Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1977) (giving an example of the focus of scholarship being on
Stone rather than Mathews at the time).
55. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 349.
56. See Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 461 (“The prophesies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). If Holmes was not joking, perhaps
prophesies could be considered non-pretentious, but announcing oneself able to foretell the future
from the bench is certainly presumptuous. Compare id. at 461, with KAHNEMAN, supra note 32,
at 377–78, 381 (debunking the idea that human beings can accurately foretell what will bring them
pleasure or pain—a central presumption of Holmes’ bad man theory of law), and Frederick Schauer,
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHIC. L. REV. 883, 894–98 (2006) (citing several sources influenced by
Danial Kahneman to demonstrate why Holmes’ ideologies may not work as a reliable decision-making
process).
57. Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 460–61. See Schauer, supra note 56, at 886.
58. Compare Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 459 (“If you want to know the law and nothing
else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict . . . .”), with Peter Baehr, Debating Totalitarianism: An Exchange of Letters
Between Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin, 51 HIST. THEORY 364, 377 (2012) (“Is it not almost comic to
speak of murder and of ‘Thou shalt not kill’ when one is faced with the building of expensive factories
for the manufacture of corpses—and these factories were built by people who had not the slightest
interest in these murders and had, so to speak, nothing evil (in the traditional sense) in mind?”).
59. Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 460–61, extended by Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207–08 (1927), and Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
60. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (quoting
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873)). Cf. Powell, Jr., supra note 53 53, at 1089 (for all of
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there is so little criticism of this development in the law today because most
of the key figures in the United States government are Benthamite
hedonists, who do not care about what the law actually is, but only what it
may do for them (or to them) in the future.61
In the law, the idea of being just, proper, or regular is captured by the
word “due,” as in due process or duly enacted law to imply legal legitimacy.62
The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I will begin by focusing on Justice Holmes’
definition of due process in Buck. Then it will explain how Holmes’ views
differed only very slightly with Justice Brandeis’, such that both confounded
the common law with feudal and canon law. Finally, The Dark Side of Due
Process: Part I will explain how Justice Powell resurrected the views of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis using a strategy pioneered in The Slaughterhouse
Cases to resurrect a racist version of the United States social compact
originally expounded in Dred Scott.
A. A DEFINITION OF “DUE” THAT INSPIRED JUSTICE HOLMES AND
ADOLF HITLER
In famed actress Heidi Schreck’s recent stage production What the
Constitution Means to Me, she presented Castle Rock doctrine and reported
what she was told: that Castle Rock decided against the rights of abused
women because a woman’s right not to be abused is a “positive” right.63
To her credit, Ms. Schreck doubted the explanation as too simple.64
Justice Powell’s focus on Lochner as the worst decision of its era, he did not improve upon Slaughterhouse
or even acknowledge that it was a bad decision).
61. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 56 at 886 (“Holmes himself, although later and less shrill than
Bentham [the proto-utilitarian], presaged the Realists by pressing against a picture of the common law
as discovery and quasi-logical reasoning. Now, having for generations bathed in the teachings of
Holmes and the Realists, we heed their lessons. We no longer deny the creative and forward-looking
aspect of common law decisionmaking, and we routinely brand those who do as ‘formalists.’ It is thus
no longer especially controversial to insist that common law judges make law.”).
62. Due, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019).
63. WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS TO ME 52:40 (Amazon 2020) (presenting Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)).
64. Id. at 1:17:27 (“Maybe we could think of the constitution as like that first mother, a
constitution that is obligated to actively look out for all of us. . . . Our constitution is really, really old.
Oh, there’s a problem with making an all new positive rights constitution, with human rights enshrined
from the beginning. It’s a, we would still have to trust the people interpreting that document right?
We would still have to trust the people in charge.”). Another problem with positive rights constitutions
is that in countries that have them, people still cannot raise their constitutions in court, a tradition the
U.S. Supreme Court began in Marbury v. Madison. Compare Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)
(“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
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However, nobody told Ms. Schreck that the overt distinctions in Castle Rock
were also present in Buck v. Bell.65
The Buck Court used distinctions between procedure and substance and
law and fact against a backdrop of public versus private rights.66 However,
positive versus negative rights, which sat in the background of Castle Rock,
would also do for Buck’s purposes.67 As Justice Holmes, the author of Buck,
once explained in the Harvard Law Review, potentially any random dichotomy

afford that protection.”), with XIANFA article 48, § 2 (2019) (China) (“Women in the People’s Republic
of China shall enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life: political, economic, cultural, social and
familial life. The State shall protect the rights and interests of women, implement a system of equal
pay for equal work, and train and select female officials.”), and Phoebe Lu, Possibilities for Constitutional
Enforcement: How Compensation Cases Clarify the Role of the Chinese Constitution, COLUM. UNDERGRAD. L.
REV. (Aug. 22, 2021), https://www.culawreview.org/journal/possibilities-for-constitutional-enforce
ment-how-compensation-cases-clarify-the-role-of-the-chinese-constitution [https://perma.cc/Q5ASQQEG] (“The Chinese Constitution . . . is regarded as the supreme legal authority, [but] it is not
judicialized, meaning that its articles are not allowed to be used as legal basis in court.”).
65. G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of the Fourteenth Amendment: Castle Rock and Its Progeny, 17 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 288, 296–97 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between procedural and
substantive is artificial because ‘all rights, including procedural rights, are ultimately substantive’ . . . .”
(quoting Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales: Executive Indifference, Judicial Complicity,
2005 CATO SUP. L. REV. 101, 110 (2005))). Compare Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755 (2005)
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)) (“[T]he so-called
‘substantive’ component to the Due Process Clause does not ‘requir[e] the State to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.’”), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207 (1927) (“The attack is not upon the procedure, but upon the substantive law.”), and John Milton,
Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (speaking of “that grounded maxim / So rife and celebrated in the
mouths / Of wisest men; that to the public good / Private respects must yield”—appearing to have
direct import in the consideration of Buck, because this was uttered by Dalila to justify her castration
and subjugation of Samson, who was thus apparently also justified in committing acts of mass
castration and sexual violence against Dalila’s people under the same principle). Cf. Holmes, Natural
Law, supra note 28, at 41–42 (giving an extremely dismal view of preexisting rights, similar to Scalia’s
view, that disparaged the drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence as naïve: “The jurists
who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind . . . accepted by them and their
neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.”), with THE DECLARATION OF
SENTIMENTS para. 2 (U.S. 1848) (the suffragettes sought to include themselves in the rights originally
declared on 1776: “We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men and women are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . . .”). The suffragettes did not
appear to argue that we needed a positive or negative rights constitution. Id.
66. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08 (using distinctions between law and fact and substantive law versus
legal process). See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456 (“In our approach towards
exactness we constantly tend to work out definite lines or equators to mark distinctions which we first
notice as a difference of poles.”). Compare Den ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855), with John Milton, Samson Agonistes 865–68 (1671) (justifying torture and the
death penalty), and HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48, 122.
67. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456–57.
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could be used to draw arbitrary, unwritten, judge-made rules and laws out
from the ethereal void between them.68
Justice Holmes put cognitive dissonance to work by focusing on extremes
to define what Holmes called the penumbra between them—law versus fact,
procedure versus substance, day versus night.69 Like Nietzsche’s version
of the Iranian prophet Zarathustra, thus spoke our legal prophet Justice
Holmes as he cast his gaze deep into the starless void between the persistent
extremes in law and society to divine bright lines in the law,
There is a difference manifest at the outset between night and day. The
statutes of Massachusetts fix the dividing points at one hour after sunset and
one hour before sunrise, ascertained according to the mean time. When he
has discovered that a difference is a difference of degree, that distinguished
extremes have between them a penumbra in which one gradually shades into
the other, a tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where you are going to draw
the line, and an advocate of more experience will show the arbitrariness of the
line proposed by putting cases very near to it on one side or the other. But
the theory of the law is that such lines exist, because the theory of the law as
to any possible conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As that
difference has no gradation about it, when applied to shades of conduct that
are very near each other it has an arbitrary look. We like to disguise the
arbitrariness, we like to save ourselves the trouble of nice and doubtful
discriminations. In some regions of conduct of a special sort we have to be
informed of facts which we do not know before we can draw our lines
intelligently, and so, as we get near the dividing point, we call in the jury.70

However, Justice Holmes balked at “leaving nice questions to the jury,”
because in his opinion, a judge who did so was weak; a real judge would
“state the law” no matter what.71 Thus spoke Justice Holmes in manly,
prophetic tones to avoid dealing with factual determinations and substantive
rights that he saw as arbitrary and overtly feminine.72 Inspired by Hegel
68. Id. at 457 (using the distinction between day and night to develop the original legal
“penumbra”). Justice Holmes originally used the idea of the penumbra to deny human rights.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I] am not prepared
to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant[s] . . . .”).
69. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456–57; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
70. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 457.
71. Id..
72. Id.; Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 460–61; Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; Olmstead, 277 U.S.
at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

340

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

and dubbed an American Nietzsche,73 Holmes redefined the common and
natural laws upon manliness and the survival of the fittest by expressing
favoritism for written laws and bright-line rules.74
Holmes’ preference for procedure over substance and laws over facts was
arbitrary and unwritten.75 These preferences came from Holmes’ personal
bias alone and did not comport with “the very essence of judicial duty,” as
expounded in Marbury v. Madison to protect individual rights.76 Indeed, even
the distinctions between apparent extremes in Buck v. Bell were Holmes’
arbitrary inventions in order to make eugenic dogma appear reasonable.77

73. See supra notes 19, 27; Seth Vannatta & Allen Mendenhall, The American Nietzsche? Fate and
Power in the Pragmatism of Justice Holmes, 85 UMKC L. REV. 187, 194 (2016) (describing Holmes’ affinity
and regard for Nietzsche); see also Murray James Braithwaite, A Dynamics Theory of Justice: Nietzsche, Holmes
and Self-Organizing Criticality, 386 (2000) (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia) (suggesting
Holmes’ reading of Nietzsche informed his views as expressed in his speeches); cf. RUSSELL,
A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 739 (explaining Hegel’s near-worship of manliness and warmongering);
id. at 767 (speaking of Nietzsche, “It is obvious that in his day-dreams he is a warrior, not a professor;
all the men he admires were military. His opinion of women, like every man’s, is an objectification of
his own emotion towards them, which is obviously one of fear. ‘Forget not thy whip’—but nine
women out of ten would get the whip away from him, and he knew it, so he kept away from women,
and soothed his wounded vanity with unkind remarks.”).
74. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 449 (demonstrating “a lively example of the struggle
for life among competing ideas, and of the ultimate victory and survival of the strongest”);
id. at 456–57 (naming his preference for laws over facts and bright-line rules over judges that lack a
sufficient backbone to strike forth); Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 28, at 42 (referring to preexisting
natural rights as the mere product of “fighting . . . to maintain them,” rather than an actual reality
established by God or nature, concluding disparagingly about natural rights, “A dog will fight for its
bone.”); HOLMES, JR., supra note 27, at 238 (“The possession of rights, as it is called, has been a
fighting-ground for centuries . . . .”).
75. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456–57 (showing these preferences originated as an
expression of what Holmes thought science was). In Buck, Holmes caused a disaster by explicitly
applying these unwritten preferences. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).
76. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 178 (1803).
77. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08. Buck resembled Chief Justice Taney’s logic in Dred Scott that also
flowed from Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave as taken from Hobbes, whence Taney ravished the
U.S. social compact with a state of nature theory every bit as corrosive to human rights as Thomas
Hobbes’s Leviathan. See Guyora Binder, Master, Slavery, and Emancipation, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435,
1441, 1462–63 (1989) (“For [Chief Justice Taney], subjection without kinship, exclusion without
sovereignty, constituted a condition of social death.”). Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
410 (1857) (“[T]he enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the
people who framed and adopted this declaration [of independence].”), with HOBBES, supra note 18,
at 122 (speaking of compacts, like the American Declaration of Independence, “the major part hath
by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is,
[he is] contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest . . . whether
his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre
he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever”).
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Like Nietzsche’s prophets of power, Holmes did not follow the old
common law rules but redefined the common law according to his personal
beliefs in order to push an agenda of Social Darwinism.78 Unlimited state
powers were key to bringing about such an agenda, where only the strong
in America would survive.79 Therefore, Holmes idealized final solutions
administered by the government onto the American people and disparaged
natural rights.80
Richard A. Loeb and Nathan F. Leopold, Jr., members of the Chicago
upper class, perfected Justice Holmes’ legal ideology when they murdered
Bobby Franks.81 Clarence Darrow declared in open court that Nietzsche
78. Allen Mendenhall, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and the Darwinian Common Law Paradigm, 7 EURO.
J. PRAGMATISM & AM. PHIL. 1, 2 (2015), https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.411 [https://perma.cc/MN
R8-TTDU]. See supra notes 19, 27, 74.
79. Sandra Day O’Connor, They Often Are Half Obscure: The Rights of the Individual and the Legacy of
Oliver W. Holmes, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 385, 388 (1992) [hereinafter O’Connor, They Often] (Holmes
“set out a theory of the Constitution that would enable the government to prevail over the individual
most of the time”); id. at 389 (“Holmes’ point was a different one—it was not that the law was properly
aimed, but that the state had the power to pass the law regardless of its aim.”).
80. Id. at 388–91 (naming Holmes’ state powers ideology, but also expressing a false hope that
it already faded away). See Hilary Eisenberg, The Impact of Dicta in Buck v. Bell, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 184, 192–93 (2013) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Impact] (noting that Buck v. Bell did not pass
away as O’Connor hoped it did, analyzing the gray area created by Buck that was applied in Stump v.
Sparkman); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (“The Indiana law vested in [the judge] the
power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization.”); see also Thomas Halper, Justice Holmes
and the Question of Race, 10 BRITISH J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 171, 196 (2021) (“In the end, so potent was
Holmes’ preoccupation with being true to himself that it left little room for caring about others.
Had Holmes believed human nature to be essentially cooperative and compassionate, perhaps the selfabsorption might have proven more benign. But he dismissed all this as fantasy.”).
81. Compare Simon Baatz, Leopold and Loeb’s Criminal Minds, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 2008),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/leopold-and-loebs-criminal-minds-996498/
[https://
perma.cc/6UBH-ZN7X] (“Leopold also had a tedious obsession with the philosophy of Friedrich
Nietzsche. He would talk endlessly about the mythical superman who, because he was a superman,
stood outside the law, beyond any moral code that might constrain the actions of ordinary men.”), with
EMERSON, FIRST SERIES, supra note 17, at 255 (“[A]s there is no screen or ceiling between our heads
and the infinite heavens, so is there no bar or wall in the soul, where man, the effect, ceases, and God,
the cause, begins.”); Beniamino Soressi, 6.1 Europe in Emerson and Emerson in Europe, in MR. EMERSON’S
REVOLUTION 325, 326 (Jean McClure Mudge ed., 2015) (“Unfortunately in Germany, Nietzsche
misused central Emersonian ideas, which Hitler and the Nazis then further perverted. In Italy, the
poet-politician D’Annunzio and Mussolini were closer to Emerson’s texts per se, yet similarly
corrupted his original intent.”), and Adam H. Hines, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.:
The Subtle Rapture of Postponed Power, 44 J. SUPREME CT. HIST. 39, 42, 46–47 (2019) (quoting Holmes,
The Path, supra note 27, at 478) (“Holmes’ decision in Buck v. Bell (1927) embodied an Emersonian
premium on self-reliance . . . . Emerson labeled the inspiration as the ‘Divine Soul,’ whereas Holmes
named his calling ‘an echo of the infinite’ and ‘the universal law,’ thereby emulating the passion and
the prose of Emerson.”).
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poisoned these young boys’ minds to believe they were Übermenschen.82
Loeb and Leopold believed, as potentially all eugenicists believed, that they
were destined to commit perfect crimes, the kind not yet seen by the world
until Hitler took power in Europe.83
After World War II and Hitler’s attempt to create the Übermench through
perfect crimes,84 Buck was rejected permanently by Americans.85 However,
the thought process behind Buck was considered disconnected from the
monstrousness of the decision.86 Likewise, the devilishness of the Nazis
was believed to have caused their behavior, and only a few dissenting voices
led by Hannah Arendt demanded a closer look at the banality of evil.87
82. Clarence Darrow, Plea for Leopold and Loeb (Aug. 22, 23, and 25, 1924), https://voices
ofdemocracy.umd.edu/clarence-darrow-plea-for-leopold-and-loeb-22-23-and-25-august-1924-speech
-text/ [https://perma.cc/HZC5-HQ4L] (“He believed that some time the superman [Übermensch]
would be born, that everybody was working toward the superman, and some time there would be one,
and he often confronted himself with the superman . . . . In formulating a superman he is, on account
of certain superior qualities inherent in him, exempt from the ordinary laws which govern ordinary
men.”). Nietzsche’s Übermench concept came from Hegel and Emerson. Compare RUSSELL,
A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 739 (noting that in Hegelian thought: “we must also take account of
world-historical individuals . . . [t]hese men are heroes, and may justifiably contravene ordinary moral
rules”), with RALPH WALDO EMERSON, REPRESENTATIVE MEN 221 (1897) [hereinafter EMERSON,
REPRESENTATIVE] (attributing this statement to Napoleon Bonaparte: “‘They charge me,’ he said,
‘with the commission of great crimes: men of my stamp to do not commit crimes.’”).
83. Darrow, supra note 82 (“[T]hey began to discuss this question of committing a perfect
crime . . . .”); cf. Clarence J. Karier, G. Stanley Hall: A Priestly Prophet of a New Dispensation,
7 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 35, 55–56 (1983) (providing historical context for the übermensch ideology).
84. See Mathew M. Stevenson, Nietzsche and the Nazis Antipodes or Ideological Kin?: Articulating
Chasms and Connections 20 (1999) (Master of Arts thesis, University of Montana) (“Hitler viewed his
‘Germanism’ as satisfying both Nietzsche’s admiration for the master morality, and his aversion to
modern movements and value systems.”).
85. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the
individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”). But see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978);
Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 35, at 462; Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 221
(“The inflammatory legacy of Buck v. Bell is largely unfounded . . . . Since Holmes’ broad theoretical
endorsement of eugenics is tangential to the substantive due process analysis, it is dicta, and merely
indicative of societal attitudes of the time.”).
87. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 42
(1963) [hereinafter ARENDT, EICHMANN] (observing how Eichmann was compared to the devil); id.
at 54 (“Despite all the efforts of the prosecution, everybody could see that this man was not a ‘monster,’
but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown.”).
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In the meantime, California restarted its eugenic sterilization program at
least twice since Hitler committed suicide.88 Civil rights advocates have
strong reasons to believe that eugenic sterilization is still being carried out
in the shadows.89 Thus, it is worth examining the extreme poles in law and
society that Justice Holmes carefully groomed in order to invent a strategy
for the ad hoc endorsement of absolute state powers.90
Holmes’ strategy of inventing bright-line rules from the apparent
penumbra between two clear points arose from Hegelian/Emersonian
double-consciousness or cognitive dissonance,91 which originated in
Hobbes and was embraced by John Milton,92 but which Hegel infused with
terms he learned from the occult.93 The key words in German are the

88. See Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir. 1978);
Bill Chappell, California’s Prison Sterilizations Reportedly Echo Eugenics Era, NPR (July 9, 2013),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/07/09/200444613/californias-prison-sterilizations
-reportedly-echoes-eugenics-era [https://perma.cc/7U63-4WNB] (highlighting investigative reporter
Corey G. Johnson’s work to expose the reinvigorated California eugenics program).
89. See LULU MILLER, WHY FISH DON’T EXIST 138–40 (2020) (“forced sterilization continues
to be performed in the ‘quiet way’ all over the country”); Mary Harris, For the Disability Community,
Britney Spears’ Situation Is All Too Familiar, SLATE (June 29, 2021, 12:04 PM), https://slate.com/humaninterest/2021/06/britney-spears-conservatorship-guardianship-disability.html [https://perma.cc/VQ
Y7-5V9D] (highlighting Sara Luterman’s dogged reporting of Britney Spears’s struggles against her
conservatorship to shed light on this issue).
90. Compare Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 460–61, with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207–08 (1927). Cf. Hines, supra note 81, at 42, 46–47; O’Connor, They Often, supra note 79, at 388–91.
91. See Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 460–61 (expounding his strategy of drawing bright
lines between two extremes); Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 478 (encouraging his students to use
his strategies to “connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of
its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law”), quoted in Hines, supra note 81, at 46–47
(appearing to compare Holmes’ legal ideology to Emerson’s over-soul concept); Porte, supra note 19,
at 42; ADELL, supra note 19, at 13–15 cf. RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 731–35.
92. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48 (theorizing that humanity is fundamentally broken,
exhibiting oxymoron and contradiction symbolized by vices, especially pride and dejection), embraced
by John Milton, Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (“[T]o the public good / Private respects must
yield . . . .”). See, e.g., O’CONNOR, A PRAYER, supra note 8, at 22 (“I will always be staggering between
Despair & Presumption, facing first one & then the other, deciding which makes me look the best,
which fits most comfortably, most conveniently.”).
93. See GLENN ALEXANDER MAGEE, HEGEL AND THE HERMETIC TRADITION 92 (2001)
(“When Hegel rejects a pair of opposites, however, one can be sure that they have not been rejected:
they have been aufgehoben; they have been cancelled, but also taken up and preserved.”); id. at 148
(“In drinking from the communion cup we become one with God. Hegel believes that he has actually
realized this oneness in his Phenomenology. For a philosopher like Hegel, who believes that at the end of
time we rend and devour our God like the Titans and Dionysus, the cup of Christ’s blood is a useful
symbol for a dangerous idea.”); cf. EMERSON, FIRST SERIES, supra note 17, at 255; RUSSELL,
A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 733–35 (discussing several of Hegel’s dichotomies, between subjective
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Ungrund or Abgrund, which in German philosophy means gulf or abyss,94
but also means more literally “groundless” as Ciceronian speakers use the
term to mean unsubstantiated or untenable.95 The term was adopted by
Hannah Arendt to describe Hitler’s “logicality” here,
In choosing the word “gulf” [Abgrund], I was unconsciously adopting an
expression of Herder’s, who once spoke of the gulf separating the crime that
is merely conceivable or possible, and real crime. You are quite right, murder
already lurks within all these ideologies, and logically one can derive almost
anything from them. But this logic, when taken to extremes, is itself highly
remarkable—I prefer to call it logicality. There is something truly crazy about
this, i.e., not only the premises, which may be, and are, untenable, but a form
of real logic that refuses to be deterred by any reality. And this reliance on the
logic that is inherent in a concept, eliminating any judgment, is new and cannot
be derived from the ideologies themselves.96

Arendt was concerned with how the Nazis managed to bridge the gap
between thinking and acting, or, to put it more accurately, between the
imagination and reality.97 Had Arendt searched a little harder into the
American Revolution, of which she was a staunch defender, she might have
discovered an answer to her question in the Ciceronian poetry of Phillis
Wheatley.98 The poetry of Phillis Wheatley was an object of wonder that
countered the Jeffersonian advocates of reason; it showed how the human

versus objective and Gegenstand versus Objekt, from which Hegel claimed to derive the Absolute Idea);
RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR, supra note 19, at 22–23 (discussing Hegel’s “dialectic”).
94. MAGEE, supra note 93, at 24, 38, 82.
95. Baehr, supra note 58, at 377. See Charles Carroll, Fourth Letter of First Citizen [1773], reprinted
in ELIHU S. RILEY, CORRESPONDENCE OF “FIRST CITIZEN”—CHARLES CARROLL OF CARROLLTON,
AND “ANTILON”—DANIEL DULANY, JR., 1773, at 196, 196 (1902) (“Groundless opinions are
destroyed, but rational judgments, or the judgments of nature, are confirmed by time.”) (translating
Cicero, De Natura Deorum 2.4–5).
96. Baehr, supra note 58, at 377.
97. Id.
98. Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773] (calling the imagination the queen of the “mental
train”). Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 160 (1978) [hereinafter ARENDT, THE LIFE]
(expressing mild disapproval for Cicero’s expression of the process of imagining given in his celebrated
tract Scipio’s Dream, that was later expounded by Wheatley in her poem On Imagination, considering it a
possible basis for totalitarianism, and lamenting “how certain trains of thought actually aim at thinking
oneself out of the world”).
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imagination bridges the gap between thinking and acting succinctly—
without relying on brittle reason to bridge the gulf.99
As expounded by Wheatley, reason can be helpful, but reason is not “the
leader of the mental train.”100 Reason can help us to dispute Thomas
Hobbes’s accusation of inherent human madness,101 as long as it remains a
servant to the emotion of love (the image of God) and an advisor to the
imagination (the leader or queen of the mental train).102 Wheatley
conspicuously led the American Revolution to assert that the fount of
human rights is emotion rather than the crown, a contention repeated in
1776 by Thomas Paine.103
Justice Holmes’ jurisprudence is also an object of wonder, but he agreed
with Thomas Hobbes’s defense of absolute monarchy or, as Hannah Arendt
labeled it, totalitarianism.104 As atheistic as Hobbes’s Leviathan may
99. Jennifer Billingsley, Works of Wonder, Wondering Eyes, and the Wondrous Poet: The Use of Wonder
in Phillis Wheatley’s Marvelous Poetics (2011), in NEW ESSAYS ON PHILLIS WHEATLEY 159, 170 (John C.
Shields & Eric D. Lamore eds., 2011) (“The trial of Wheatley illustrated this issue. Even the attestation
of such eminent men could not convince everyone of Wheatley’s literary achievement. Like Hume
and Jefferson demonstrated, reason could not answer this question adequately, and further application
of reason could not repair the inadequacies of reason. To avoid confronting established beliefs, reason
became a vehicle of doubt. . . . In contrast, Wheatley successfully employs a strategy beyond the
limitations of reason. For Wheatley wonder is that subjective faculty that can breach the gap between
man and the world and help negotiate a new understanding of race and reality after reason fails.”);
id. at 179 (“Whereas Hobbes defied the ability of men to realize the meaning of a work of wonder,
Wheatley recognizes this very power in Ethiopians.”).
100. Phillis Wheatley, On Imagination [1773].
101. See Billingsley, supra note 99, at 170, 179.
102. Id.; Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence (1773) (explaining the relationship
between reason and love, and discussing the role of human emotions generally as well). Cf. RUSSELL,
UNPOPULAR, supra note 19, at 148 (supplementing previous forays into questions of natural human
love with important observations).
103. Phillis Wheatley, Thoughts on the Works of Providence [1773]; Phillis Wheatley, America (1768)
(speaking of Great Britain’s indolence and failure to love America). Wheatley’s exposition of human
emotion in several of her poems was followed by the founders, who used emotion as “the touchstone
of nature.” PAINE, COMMON, supra note 1, at 22–23; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 458 (1793)
(Wilson, J.) (explaining the Ciceronian idea of common sense, and its accepted role in American law as
a replacement for “the English maxim, that the King or sovereign is the fountain of Justice;”
Justice Wilson modified this maxim when he stated: “The sovereign, when traced to his source, must
be found in the man”); Joseph Ladd, The Prospects of America [1785] (speaking of “the far-spread name
/ Of wondrous WHEATLY [sic], Afric’s heir to fame,” whose “glowing genius shines / . . . With magic
power the grand descriptions roll / Thick on the mind, and agitate the soul.”).
104. Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 AM. BAR ASSOC. J. 569, 573 (1945)
(“If totalitarianism comes to America . . . [i]t will come through dominance in the judiciary of men who
have accepted a philosophy of law that has its roots in Hobbes and its fruition in implications from
the philosophy of Holmes.”). See Nourse, Buck, supra note 44, at 101–02 (describing Buck as a
representation of the banality of evil, which Arendt argued was a cause of the holocaust); RUSSELL,
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be,105 it is also a work of absolute religious prophesy or magic,106 like the
Witch Trials in Massachusetts.107 For example, John Donne captured the
puritanical oxymoron lifted from Hobbes by asking a benevolent “three
person’d God” to batter and rape him into purity.108
A HISTORY, supra note 22, at 737 (speaking of Hegel’s monarchical views that inspired Holmes:
“Democracy and aristocracy alike belong to the stage where some are free, despotism to that where
one is free, and monarchy to that in which all are free. This is connected with the very odd sense in
which Hegel uses the word ‘freedom.’”).
105. John Henry, A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of Soul,
49 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INSTS. 172, 175–76 (1986) (commenting on why Henry More
specifically labeled Hobbes an atheist); Willis B. Glover, God and Thomas Hobbes, 29 CHURCH HIST.
275, 275–78 (1960) (noting the actual reasons “Hobbes was denounced as an atheist” including that,
“The stark clarity with which Hobbes stated his views must have been particularly disconcerting to
those who held very similar views but were accustomed to think of them in contexts and terminology
that obscured implications Hobbes laid bare.”).
106. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 119 (“This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is
called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or
rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our
peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth,
he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled
to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.”);
id. at 231 (appearing to declare support for the sea monster known as Leviathan in the book of Job,
and arguing that humankind should strive to follow the commands of Leviathan as if it were God);
id. at 329 (justifying absolute monarchies through religious argumentation: “By the Kingdome of
Heaven, is meant the Kingdom of the King that dwelleth in Heaven; and his Kingdome was the people
of Israel, . . . till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their King, after
the manner of other Nations”); Glover, supra note 105, at 294 (quoting Nathaniel H. Henry, Milton and
Hobbes: Mortalism and the Intermediate State, 48 STUDIES IN PHILOLOGY 234, 249 (1951)) (“Henry hardly
goes too far when he says that theology was ‘practiced at its scholarly best by Milton and Hobbes.’”).
But see PAINE, COMMON, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting 1 Samuel 12:19) (adding the conclusion of the
people of Israel who said to the prophet Samuel, “pray for thy servants unto the Lord thy God that we
die not, for we have added unto our sins this evil, to ask for a king”); Benjamin Ramm, Why You Should
Re-Read Paradise Lost, BBC: CULTURE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/culture/
article/20170419-why-paradise-lost-is-one-of-the-worlds-most-important-poems [https://perma.cc/
2FSC-PHKS] (noting that, like Hobbes, Milton was also counted among “the Devil’s party without
knowing it” quoting from William Blake’s book The Marriage of Heaven and Hell ).
107. Several sources note the commonality between Hobbes and Henry More’s Platonic
Rationalism, and how they disagreed on smaller points rather than the big picture. See Henry, supra
note 105, at 175–76; Glover, supra note 105, at 275–78. Henry More’s interest in witchcraft, in turn,
gave the Massachusetts Bay Puritans a basis for their infamous Witch Trials. See generally JOSEPH
GLANVILL & HENRY MORE, SADUCISMUS TRIUMPHATUS (1681); COTTON MATHER, MEMORABLE
PROVIDENCES, RELATING TO WITCHCRAFTS AND POSSESSIONS [1693] (referencing “Mr. Glanvil,
Dr. More, and several other Great Names” as an inspiration in the unnumbered introductory pages).
108. John Donne, Holy Sonnet XIV (1633) (“Batter my heart, three-person’d God . . . Take me
to you, imprison me, for I, / Except you enthrall me, never shall be free, / Nor ever chaste, except you
ravish me.”). The Puritans went further and mixed up their ideas of God with the power of the State,
cycling through celebrations and reactions to state violence in the name of God. Compare HOBBES,
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Following in the penumbral shades of Donne, Holmes developed two
dichotomies in Buck v. Bell.109 Justice Holmes pretended to discover a proeugenic dogma between fact and law, and procedure and substance.110 The
former dichotomy was already developed under plenary power doctrine to
deny review of facts determined in immigration cases,111 and the latter
appeared to be invented by Justice Holmes.112
The point of the dichotomies was not judicial restraint,113 nor was
Justice Holmes befuddled by a large gray area between two clear poles.114
supra note 18, at 46–48, with John Milton, Samson Agonistes 532–40, 1639–68 [1671] (appearing to draw
an eerie comparison between a mass suicide killing as a payment of sexual violence for sexual violence
with a holy act like Christ’s sacrifice on the cross).
109. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927). Cf. Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 186
(noting how Holmes used a dichotomy that he established between substantive and procedural due
process to decline reviewing Carrie Buck’s fundamental right to procreate). In Buck, the old Puritan
version of due process balancing between private and public interests was applied. See, e.g., John Milton,
Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (“[T]hat grounded maxim / So rife and celebrated in the mouths /
Of wisest men; that to the public good / Private respects must yield.”).
110. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08. Cf. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History
of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 788 (2009) [hereinafter
Nourse, A Tale] (considering more subtle false dichotomies that arise once one attempts to defend an
idea of “substantive” due process, which itself arose from the idea that substance can be safely
separated from procedure; one of Holmes’ central, widely un-criticized premises).
111. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (explaining the
dichotomy between fact and law in immigration cases like this was entirely invented by the courts to
limit the “final determination of those facts . . . to executive officers,” while preserving the review of
legal errors even in the case of non-citizens to Article III Courts), superseded by law as stated in DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1977 (2020) (appearing to unsettle the old fact/law dichotomy in order
to decide that Congress has the power to delegate the final decision on both law and fact to executive
officers).
112. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; Nourse, Buck, supra note 44 at 111. Eisenberg’s thinking
properly differs from the not-so-subtle attempts of Justice Powell to place the beginning of
rational/intermediate/strict basis scrutiny in footnote four of Carolene Products, in order to extend and
reaffirm a substantive/procedural dichotomy that Holmes deployed in Buck as the thing that saved
America from Lochner. Compare Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 196 n.98 (identifying an ulterior
line of origin for rational basis scrutiny ostensibly beginning or at least exemplified in Buck), with supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
113. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L. J. 449, 453
(1994) (“To the extent that the classical conception of judicial self-restraint relies on Holmes as one of
its historical props, it is a weak conception.”). Compare Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08 (adopting economic
theories promulgated by eugenic propagandists to justify his holding), with O’Connor, They Often, supra
note 79, at 385 (presenting the quip from Holmes’ Lochner dissent that “the Constitution ‘does not
enact Mr. Hebert Spencer’s Social Statics” as an expression of judicial restraint, when Holmes himself
was not averse to adopting popular economic theories of his day as if they were original constitutional
principles).
114. Holmes’ tone, while pulling new distinctions out of the ether, was one of smug triumph
rather than humble caution. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456–57.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

348

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

Rather, Holmes sought to befuddle others with his dichotomies, which were
the basis of sheer fiat.115 Holmes was the architect of the dichotomies he
cited, predefining each pole he selected as favored and disfavored, but
Holmes’ favorites of procedure and law over substance and facts were
completely arbitrary.116
According to Holmes, procedures and laws are favored to facts and
substances so that human rights (which are always based in facts and
substance)117 can be ignored by judges.118 However, procedure is not
necessarily the opposite of substance and due process need not ignore
substantial or substantive rights.119 Nevertheless, Bernaysian judge
endorsed procedures like those observed in Buck, successfully neutralized
substantial rights for an era.120
Holmes never defended, justified, or substantiated why substituting a
judge-made procedure for substantial rights made rational sense.121
According to Holmes, it was merely a failure of one’s manliness to consider
a party’s rights.122 Holmes’ idea of the common law was a reiteration of
puritanical legal positivism,123 which confounded the feudal, canon, and
115. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28 at 457 (characterizing those who call in the jury to
decide hard questions as weaklings).
116. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08 (citing to no law or precedent for why determining legal
procedures and laws rather than substantive rights and facts were preferable in federal practice);
cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (doubting Holmes’ dichotomies, saying “fundamental
rights depend, . . . upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law”); John Milton,
Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (preferring public rights over private rights to justify injustice).
117. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57 (discussing the courts should be the finders of facts).
118. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
119. Miccio, supra note 65, at 296. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57.
120. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08, extended in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488–89 (1976), and
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
121. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08; Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 456–57.
122. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 444–45 (“It is proper to . . . discover what ideals
of society have been strong enough to reach that final form of expression, or what have been the
changes in dominant ideals from century to century.” Holmes hoped that the progression of common
law would eventually dispense with the petit jury and finally transition potentially all trials “to the
commercial and rational test of the judgment of a man trained to decide.”); id. at 455–56 (disdaining
“intellectual indolence or weakness”); Holmes, The Path, supra note 27, at 477 (concluding that “the
weak and foolish must be left to their folly”); Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 28, at 42 (noting that
even the most “tender-hearted judge” could sentence men to death in order to preserve mere cargo).
123. Several scholars have identified Holmes’ “thoroughgoing positivism.” Patrick J. Kelley,
The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 429, 453 (1990) (book review). Cf. John Milton,
Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671]. Whether scholars focused on Bentham’s influence over Holmes or
the influence of Emerson and other Hegelians over Holmes, ultimately Holmes’ legal positivism
traced back to Oliver Cromwell and the Puritans. AUSTIN WOOLRYCH, COMMONWEALTH TO

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/1

26

Schroeder: The Dark Side of Due Process – Part I

2022]

THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART I

349

common laws, in the same way, the Witch Judges of Salem infamously did
two centuries earlier.124
In Buck, the puritanical idea of “due” process was applied by preferring
procedure to substance stating: “The attack is not upon the procedure but
upon the substantive law.”125 The Court seized on a definition of “due”
process as mere procedural adherence to formalities that do not require the
Court to consider the substantive rights of the patient writing,
There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the rights of the
patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in this case was taken
in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of observation,
there is no doubt that in that respect the plaintiff in error has had due process
at law.126

Therefore, patient consent was not required for doctors to snatch up
individuals off the street to remove their body parts like
Dr. Frankenstein.127 Women were more likely than men to be snatched,
and non-white people were more likely than white folk to be taken.128 The
Nazis later used this concept of “due” process to not only sterilize countless

PROTECTORATE 271–73, 300 (1982) (noting that the Massachusetts Bay Puritans invented legal
positivism in its modern form); see, 11 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 14, 42,
81 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, THE WORKS] (demonstrating how Bentham often
cited Cromwell and the Puritans as the inspiration of his works); EMERSON, FIRST SERIES, supra
note 17, at 249 (quoting Henry More, Psychodia Platonica 21 [1642]) (Emerson also enjoyed quoting the
Puritans for inspiration).
124. AUSTIN, supra note 123, at 271–73, 300; Bradley Chapin, Written Rights: Puritan and Quaker
Procedural Guarantees, 114 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 323, 346–48 (1990) (noting the United States’
Founders’ rejection of their ancestors’ legal positivism by noting “the Salem witchcraft trials” and other
“glaring examples of severity and injustice”).
125. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause,
120 YALE L.J. 400 435–37 (2010) (considering the origins of due process in the Massachusetts Bay
Body of Liberties and other legal positivist codes in the American colonies).
126. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
127. Id.
128. Id.; Alexandra M. Stern, Forced sterilization policies in the US targeted minorities and those with
disabilities—and lasted into the 21st century, MICH. INST. HEALTHCARE POL’Y & INNOVATION (Sept. 23,
2020), https://ihpi.umich.edu/news/forced-sterilization-policies-us-targeted-minorities-and-thosedisabilities-and-lasted-21st [https://perma.cc/FHN3-LSD4] (“[W]omen and people of color
increasingly became the target, as eugenics amplified sexism and racism.”). See also Gregory N. Price
et al., Did North Carolina Economically Breed-Out Blacks During its Historical Eugenic Sterilization Campaign?,
15 AM. REV. POL. ECONOMY 1, 10 (June 27, 2020) (discussing how North Carolina’s eugenic
sterilization targeted people of color).
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Jews and non-white people129 but to further justify state-sanctioned
experimentations including live dissections of innocent people for
science.130
Professor Rodney A. Smolla once imagined Socrates saying to Holmes,
“The Nazi’s simply carried your philosophy to its natural conclusions.”131
But, unfortunately, questioning Holmes even in an imaginary setting, led
directly to Holmes’ false defenses of democracy.132 From Holmes’ time
until around 2018,133 the Court remained relatively un-criticized when
preferring law-over-facts as a democratic norm in order to bow to whatever
factual decision executive officials made as accurate and lawful,
The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that Carrie Buck “is
the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise
afflicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general
health and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her
sterilization,” and thereupon makes the order. In view of the general
declaration of the Legislature and the specific findings of the Court obviously

129. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V.
OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 30–32, 172 (2008) (“When the
German sterilization law was first proposed, the press emphasized the analogy to American laws.”);
see also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING
OF NAZI RACE LAW 78–80 (2017). But see Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 189–90 (arguing that
though the Nazis administered “mass sterilization under similarly worded law” as the Virginia law
upheld in Buck, that this was not necessarily inspired by Justice Holmes’ substantive due process
analysis).
130. See PAUL WEINDLING, VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS OF NAZI HUMAN EXPERIMENTS
81 (2015); cf. Keiligh Baker, Eduard Pernkopf: The Nazi book of anatomy still used by surgeons, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-49294861 [https://perma.cc/W474-MJU2].
131. Rodney A Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 214
(1994).
132. Id. at 215 (“You cannot begin to understand my philosophy, Socrates, because you cannot
begin to understand democracy . . . . If there’s a link to the Nazis in this trial, Socrates, it is you!”).
133. Id.; Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 28, at 42 (noting that all human rights are expendable
“whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power in the community, is thought to
demand it”); Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetorical Allure of Post-Racial Process Discourse and the Democratic
Myth, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 523, 526 (2018) (grappling with the modern day emanations of Holmes’
excuse of democracy for affirming unjust laws). See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and
the Canon, 17 CONST. COMM. 295, 296, 305 (2000) (quoting Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482 (1903));
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (naming the
limitations a majority may assume when conducting biological experiments on the minority under
Buck); cf. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 66 (1872) (using the excuse of democratic government
to deny the judicial protection of human rights), extended by Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872)
(denying women the right to practice law).
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we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist
they justify the result.134

This decision was embarrassed by the fact that the eugenic pseudo-science
applied by Carrie Buck’s physicians was all debunked.135 The very
foundations of the balancing of costs and benefits in Buck were unsettled,
and yet the holding remains.136 A test that may give different results on
different days should not be touted as a legitimate test in any court, and yet
the United States Supreme Court embraces it wholesale and regularly gives
it credence in the 2020s.137
Sterilizing people to purify the American gene pool through
miscegenation laws was a sheer cost to society with no proven benefits to
any person.138 Arguably, eugenics encouraged instances of genetic disease
such as those suffered by European Royals and American Elites.139 In
order to avoid “death spirals” in healthcare law,140 the court should
134. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
135. See Dr. Howard Markel, Column: The false, racist theory of eugenics once ruled science. Let’s never let
that happen again, PBS NEW HOUR (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:15 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
nation/column-the-false-racist-theory-of-eugenics-once-ruled-science-lets-never-let-that-happen-agai
n [https://perma.cc/DFS6-TQLA] (emphasizing the lack of evidence to support the eugenics theory).
136. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207, extending Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905)
(requiring “the risk of such an injury . . . to be . . . weighed as against the benefits”). See Peter S.
Canellos & Joel Lau, The Surprisingly Strong Supreme Court Precedent Supporting Vaccine Mandates, POLITICO
(Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/08/vaccine-mandate-strongsupreme-court-precedent-510280 [https://perma.cc/5CKZ-TFY5] (comparing the arguments made
in Jacobson with arguments being made today); cf. Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80 at 185 (arguing
“that Justice Holmes’ endorsement of eugenic sterilization is now merely dicta” in apparent hopes to
preserve the holding as separate from the practice of eugenics).
137. Compare Buck, 274 U.S. at 207, with Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24. See, e.g., June Medical Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2120–33 (2020) (plurality opinion); NOURSE, supra note 129, at 58
(noting how eugenics were sold to the American public as a simple calculation of costs and benefits).
138. MILLER, supra note 89, at 133 (“Variation in genes, and hence in behavior and physical
traits [helps species survive the natural chaos of the world]. Homogeneity is a death sentence. To rid
a species of its mutants and outliers is to make that species dangerously vulnerable to the elements.”);
see DAREN BAKST, NORTH CAROLINA’S FORCED STERILIZATION PROGRAM: A CASE FOR
COMPENSATING THE LIVING VICTIMS, JOHN LOCKE FOUNDATION: POLICY REPORT 16 (2011)
(“There was no benefit from sterilizing these individuals . . . .”).
139. See ADAM KUPER, INCEST, COUSIN MARRIAGE, AND THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND, 174 PAST & PRESENT 158, 183 (2002)
(“Both Darwin and Galton had accepted George Darwin’s reassuring findings on the effects of cousin
marriage. The eugenicists accordingly avoided the issue.”); cf. Tim M. Berra et al., Was the
Darwin/Wedgewood Dynasty Adversely Affected by Consanguinity?, 60 BIOSCIENCE 376, 382 (2010)
(“Our answer . . . is yes.”).
140. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015).
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affirmatively overrule the cost/benefit due process framework invented by
eugenic propagandists like Harry Laughlin.141
Holmes’ preference for law and procedure over facts and substance
expressed in Buck provided the world with perhaps its first justification of a
final solution that would eventually be administered in Germany to the
horror of all.142 Holmes no less than endorsed human sacrifice in Buck
when he wrote,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt
to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.143

This passage usually causes such drastic feelings of horror in modern
America that the bases of it are usually overlooked.144 Americans prefer to
believe that Buck was overruled or set aside by Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson,145 and so we usually ignore the existence of Madrigal v.
Quilligan.146 Holmes’ arbitrary preferences that conflicted with Munn v.
141. Id. See LAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 454 (beginning with an introductory cost/benefit
balancing test); Tim M. Berra et al., The Galton–Darwin–Wedgwood Pedigree of H. H. Laughlin, 101 BIO. J.
LINNEAN SOC. 228, 228–30 (2010).
142. See NOURSE, supra note 129, at 30–32, 172.
143. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Cf. Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 28, at 42
(Holmes’ rationale in Buck was earlier stated in his article that pilloried the natural law, with very similar
words regarding the government’s right to sacrifice the lives of its citizens “not only in war, but
whenever the interest of society, that is, of the predominant power in the community, is thought to
demand it”).
144. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 35, at 462; Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 221.
145. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here
with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”), criticized in NOURSE, supra note 129, at 172
(criticizing Skinner for not affirmatively overruling Buck).
146. Madrigal v. Quilligan, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423* (C.D. Cal. 1978) (“The requested
document is not available from the Court.”). See MAYA MANIAN, THE STORY OF MADRIGAL V.
QUILLIGAN: COERCED STERILIZATION OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN 1, 2 (Univ. of San
Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2018–04) (“The counter-movement against eugenic sterilization
culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma. Although Skinner did
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Illinois,147 were extended, banally, in Mathews v. Eldridge that similarly ignored
Red Lion Broadcasting Company. v. FCC.148
Hitler murdered millions of people and attempted to overrun the world
with the eugenic, Übermensch ideology invented in America under Justice
Holmes’ watch.149 The events of the World War II era were not enough
for federal judges to officially close the door on eugenics.150 Justice Powell
not explicitly overrule Buck v. Bell, it rejected eugenic sterilization as a valid state goal and recognized
that procreation ‘involves one of the basic civil rights of man.’ Yet, Skinner did not lead to the end of
forced sterilization in the United States.”).
147. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208 (disparaging equal protection claims raised alongside due process
claims, by calling them “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 130, 134–35 (1876) (requiring that public interest regulations ensure that the public have equal
right to access public property and equal protection of the law therein under a common carrier
rationale); cf. Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 54–55 (1913) (finding that
“[t]he palpable inhumanity and immorality of such a scheme” made the question of whether the costs
and benefits balanced in favor of the scheme “not deserving of serious consideration”).
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (“We conclude that an evidentiary hearing
is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative
procedures fully comport with due process.”); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
398–99 (1969) (using the prevalence of “[c]omparative hearings between competing applicants for
broadcast spectrum” to interpret common carrier common law extended under the Communications
Act of 1934 to protect the equal rights to of listeners and viewers to an even debate of issues under the
First Amendment).
149. NOURSE, supra note 129, at 30–32; Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: Further Readings, LAW LIBRARY
- AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, https://law.jrank.org/pages/7386/Holmes-OliverWendell-Jr.html [https://perma.cc/H8KB-TTR2] (writing immediately following a discussion about
Buck: “Holmes’ jurisprudence also suggested that the law is what the government says it is.
This approach, called [legal positivism], was called into question in the 1930s and 1940s with the rise
of totalitarian regimes in Germany and Italy and the rule of Stalin the Soviet Union.”); Mathew Day,
‘Shocking’ Holocaust Study Claims Nazis Killed Up To 20 Million People, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2013),
https://www.businessinsider.com/shocking-new-holocaust-study-claims-nazis-killed-up-to-20-millio
n-people-2013-3 [https://perma.cc/GT5J-AE9X]. Eugenics seems to have been doubly invented in
the United States, first through Emerson’s metaphysical ravings about the “over-soul,” which were
repurposed by Nietzsche in his Will to Power as the “over-man” or übermensch. Soressi, supra note 81,
at 365–67 (noting the connection of the übermensch drawn from the “over-soul” in Emerson’s writings
with the ideologies of Hitler and Mussolini); EMERSON, FIRST SERIES, supra note 17, at 252–53
(speaking of “that Over-soul, within which every man’s particular being is contained and made one
with all other; that common heart of which all sincere conversation is the worship, to which all right
action is submission; that overpowering reality . . . . Meantime within man is the soul of the whole; the
wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is equally related; the eternal ONE.”);
Hines, supra note 81, at 46–47 (noting Emerson’s metaphysical influence upon Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.). Second, in furtherance of America’s pursuit of the “over-soul” or “over-man,” the practice of
eugenic pseudo-science itself was invented directly under Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ watch in
America as well, inspiring Hitler. See WHITMAN, supra note 129, at 78–80; see also Vannatta &
Mendenhall, supra note 73, at 194.
150. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text; see also BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05
(Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (investigative reporter Corey Johnson stated: “At the point that Dr. Heinrich
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endorsed the old ideas of Justice Holmes as if they had nothing to do with
Hitler’s parallel adoption of a Will to Power inspired by the American poet
Ralph Waldo Emerson.151
Liberals still extoll the values of Mathews balancing tests as if the plurality
opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld did not end in a travesty.152 Even with the
writing on the wall, Americans are not ready to move out of the darkness
and into the light.153 Most of us lean into the shadows of Mathews balancing
tests “precisely to avoid any knowledge of” injustice;154 the phrase que sera,
sera is upon our lips;155 the false optimism James Baldwin warned against

was hired sterilization procedures had been going on for years at multiple prisons. He strongly believed
that there were women that were gaming the system and that needed to be stopped . . . . That attitude
tracked precisely to the historical attitude of the California leaders of the eugenic movement.
They had always used cost/benefit as the justifier for why they were doing what they were doing.”).
151. See supra notes 120, 141, 149 and accompanying text.
152. Compare Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Habeas: Due Process, the Suspension Clause, and
Judicial Review of Expedited Removal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 34 GEO. IMMIGRATION L. J.
405, 446 (2020) (“It is time to apply the Mathews factors to the admissions and expanded expedited
removal contexts.”), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Mathews
dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that
will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the function
involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process.”); and Lithwick,
Nevermind, supra note 36 (explaining the travesty of Hamdi in clear and unambiguous terms).
153. See supra note 152. Compare Hannah Yasharoff, Read Britney Spears’ full statement from her
conservatorship hearing: ‘I am traumatized’, USA TODAY (June 24, 2021, 11:16 AM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/entertainment/celebrities/2021/06/24/britney-spears-full-statement-conservatorship-he
aring/5333532001/ [https://perma.cc/N82B-XDQ7] (“I was told right now in the conservatorship,
I am not able to get married or have a baby, I have a (IUD) inside of myself right now so I don’t get
pregnant. I wanted to take the (IUD) out so I could start trying to have another baby. But this socalled team won’t let me go to the doctor to take it out because they don’t want me to have children—
any more children.”), with Ramtin Arablouei et al., < The Shadows of the Constitution, NPR (Nov. 12, 2020,
12:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/933825483 [https://perma.cc/56AK-KQHP] (quoting
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS TO ME (Amazon 2020)) (“And this is when William O. Douglas
brought out his beautiful penumbra metaphor. This is when he said, one thing our Constitution surely
guarantees is the right to privacy and that this allows a woman to put in an IUD.”).
154. BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 60.
155. See Timothy Besley, Comments on: In Quest of the Political: The Political Economy of Development
Policy Making by Merilee S. Grindle, LSE (Aug. 1999), at 3, https://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/
grindle.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ5B-C5CD] (noting that cost-benefit balancing analyses can “simply
take a que sera view of policy”). With the help of Baldwin, we can imagine Doris Day advocating for
Mathews by singing que sera, sera, whatever will be, will be—which is not prudent for a judge to say when
deciding the fate of actual legal cases. Compare Doris Day, Que Sera, Sera [1965], with BALDWIN, THE
CROSS, supra note 4, at 60, 78 (explaining that Doris Day, like Mathews, is one “of the most grotesque
appeals to innocence that the world has ever seen”). See Margulies, supra note 152, at 446. Cf. James
F. Bullock, Democratic Due Process: Administrative Procedure After Bishop v. Wood, 1977 DUKE L.J. 453, 465
(attempting to equate natural law theory and penumbral rights theory); id. at 467 (at the time it was
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still pervades America,156 and we continue to chase perfect crimes over
imperfect justice as Flannery O’Connor and Octavio Paz observed over
sixty-five years ago.157
B. HOW PENUMBRAL RIGHTS THEORY CONFOUNDED
FEUDAL, CANON, AND COMMON LAW
In its day Buck v. Bell was an exceptional decision, not ordinarily extended
outside of health law.158 This fact was demonstrated in the next year when
the court ignored a state law that criminalized wiretapping in Olmstead v.
United States, where Buck was cited in Brandeis’ dissent in favor of enforcing
the state law.159 However, Buck gave credence to a specific subset of racist,
elitist, and bigoted state laws that were reaffirmed decades later under
Brandeis’ theory of penumbral privacy rights.160
Long before his dissent in Olmstead, Brandeis made a name for himself in
privacy law by coauthoring a Harvard Law Review article entitled The Right to
Privacy.161 Brandeis began his Harvard article with a Millar v. Taylor epigraph
decided Mathews symbolized “the Court’s current indecision about how best to analyze” due process
claims).
156. Compare BALDWIN, THE CROSS, supra note 4, at 60, 78, with Margulies, supra note 152,
at 446.
157. See Vikki Bell, On the Critique of Secular Ethics: An Essay with Flannery O’Connor and Hannah
Arendt, 22 THEORY CULTURE SOC. 1, 8 (2005); OCTAVIO PAZ, LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 59–60
(Lysander Kemp trans., 1961) (observing, from the Mexican perspective, that U.S. “laws, customs and
public and private ethics all tend to preserve human life,” and yet: “This protection does not prevent
the number of ingenious and refined murders, of perfect crimes and crime-waves, from increasing.
The professional criminals who plot their murders with a precision impossible to a Mexican, the delight
they take in describing their experiences and methods, the fascination with which the press and public
follow their confessions, and the recognized inefficiency of the systems of prevention, show that the
respect for life of which Western civilization is so proud is either incomplete or hypocritical.”); see also
George Piggford, “A Dialogue Between Above and Below”: Flannery O’Connor, Martin Buber, and “Revelation”
after the Holocaust, 13 FLANNERY O’CONNOR REV. 90, 92 (2015). Cf. supra notes 14–16, 58, 81–83.
158. O’Connor, They Often, supra note 79, at 390–91 (claiming that “[t]he Court has never cited
Buck v. Bell, for instance, as support for any important proposition”); see also Greene, supra note 35,
at 462; Eisenberg, The Impact, supra note 80, at 221. But see Nourse, Buck, supra note 44, at 110–11
(noting that prior to Buck, “sterilization laws had become a dead letter due to hostile state court
constitutional rulings”).
159. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)) (Buck was cited in Brandeis’ dissent as a pro-government decision, because
the majority in Olmstead decided that state law could not stop the state police from breaking the law).
160. See O’Connor, They Often, supra note 79, at 390–91 (emphasizing the limited nature of Buck);
Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir. 1978) (demonstrating
the reemergence of eugenics at a later time); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (“The
Indiana law vested in Judge Stump the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization.”).
161. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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naming the court’s power to create new common law causes of action.162
The problem with Brandeis’ citation of Millar, unaddressed in The Right to
Privacy, was that the House of Lords overruled Millar shortly after it was
decided.163
Judge Willes’ opinion in Millar, which was featured at the top of The Right
to Privacy, cited to a litany of Star Chamber decisions.164 Willes explained
the basis of his common law theory upon “prosecution in the Star
Chamber,” of which England retained no records because the Star Chamber
was not a court of precedent or common law.165 Judge Willes’ dependence
on the Star Chamber as a source of common law, and the absolute nature
of the rights contended for in Millar, led to the Millar decision’s demise in
1774 in Donaldson v. Beckett.166
Justice Brandeis was right that there was a statute after William the
Bastard conquered England that allowed a cause of action vi et armis.167 He
was also correct that the common law developed strategies to expand the
rights granted by England’s Norman conqueror.168 But the common law

162. Id. at 193 (quoting Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2312 (Eng.)).
163. Id. at 193–94; Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2312 (Eng.), overruled by Donaldson v.
Becket [1774] 4 Burr. 2408 (Eng.).
164. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2312–14 (Eng.) (beginning his opinion with a “decree
of the Star-Chamber, 23 June 1585” and continuing on to “the year 1640,” when the Star Chamber
was abolished by statute, and stating “the Star-Chamber in 1637 expressly supposes a copy-right to
exist otherwise than by patent, order, or entry in the register of the Stationers Company: which could
only be by Common law”).
165. Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2313 (Eng.) (“Most of the judicial proceedings of the
Star-Chamber are lost or destroyed.”).
166. Id. at 2373 (Yates, J., dissenting) (The Star Chamber is “a Court the very name whereof is
sufficient to blast all precedents brought from it.”); Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of
Literary Property [in Donaldson v. Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 992 (1813) [hereinafter THE
PARLIAMENTARY] (labeling Judge Willes’ Star Chamber precedents a product “of the grossest tyranny
and usurpation” and stating that the Star Chamber is one of “the very last places in which I should
have dreamt of finding the least trace of the common law”).
167. Compare Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193 (“[I]n very early times, the law gave a
remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis.”), with Rattlesdene
v. Grunestone [1317] YB 10 Edw II (54 SS) 140 (Eng.), in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 341 (2013) (using a statute vi et armis to vindicate
a right to wholesome food and drink, i.e., in the year 1317, English judges were already using the
common law to expand upon the limitations of their statutes).
168. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193–95 (noting the gradual expansion of
common law forms but failing to name the source of that gradual development in actions of trespass
on the case); see also BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 167, at 341 (demonstrating that English jurists were
developing the common law long before trespass on the case as well).
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never used the Star Chamber to make common law; rather, it expanded
upon the positive laws by adopting new forms of action through trespass
on the case.169
The common law did not take as long as Justice Brandeis presented to
modernize the law.170 For example, the common law first invented the
warranty of merchantability under the statute vi et armis to protect the
English people from poisonous food and drink.171 This happened in the
1300s and supports the legend that the common law survived the Norman
Conquest and maintained the English people’s preexisting human rights
despite feudal usurpation.172
Rather than present this legend, Brandeis chose to define the common
law with the Star Chamber, and he chose to cite a case that arose after the
Star Chamber was abolished.173 Thirty-eight years after Brandeis published
his article, he adopted Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington,
contradicting his law review article.174 With this reversion in Camden’s
169. See H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 61–64, 67, 83 (4th ed.,
2002) (explaining trespass on the case and providing case examples). Indeed, Millar was, itself, an
action for trespass on the case. See Millar, 4 Burr. at 2305 (recognizing this case was “a plea of trespass
upon the case,” which was a request that the Court recognize a new common law form).
170. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193–96, 210–12 (emphasizing “modern
enterprise and invention” perpetually requires judges to reevaluate and modify old laws to ensure they
properly address present day concerns). The implied warranty of merchantability, for example, was
already being developed by English jurists in the year 1317. See supra notes 167–169.
171. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 167, at 341.
172. See Sir Henry Vane [the Younger], A Healing Question 4–5 [1656] (noting that the root of
the tree of liberty in England preceded “the evil of that Government which rose in and with the
Norman conquest”); BAKER, supra note 169, at 12 (describing the Norman Conquest as
“a catastrophe that determined the whole future of English law”). It appears that King Alfred, known
as the Elfin King, stated a nascent form of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
which lies at the heart of the American ideal of “equal justice under law” that emblazons the entrance
to the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; The Laws of King Alfred: Alfred’s Dooms,
in 1 ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 55 (1840) (“Judge thou very evenly: judge thou
not one doom to the rich, another to the poor; nor one to thy friend, another to thy foe, judge thou.”);
Joshua J. Schroeder, America’s Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say What the Law Is,
43 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 833, 860 (2015) [hereinafter Schroeder, America’s]; JOHN ADAMS, THE
REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 88 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000) [hereinafter
ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY] (referring to the laws of pre-Norman Conquest England and Alfred’s
“Dome Book”).
173. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193 (quoting Millar , 4 Burr. at 2312).
174. Compare Millar, 4 Burr. at 2312, with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (Eng.)).
This is contradictory, because Lord Camden is the chief reason Millar v. Taylor was overruled in
Donaldson v. Becket. See supra note 166 (referring to Lord Camden’s disparaging statements regarding
Judge Willes’ opinion in Millar).
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favor, Brandeis seemed to abandon Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v.
Marsh.175
Folsom disagreed with Camden’s attack on common law copyright in
Donaldson in favor of American common law rights.176 While drafting the
United States Constitution, James Madison and James Wilson joined forces
to defend common law patent and copyright with Lord Coke’s
precedents.177 But Justice Brandeis did not search out the root of our
common law of author-owned copyright, which is the primary basis of the
privacy rights he sought to defend.178
Justice Brandeis failed to comprehend the primary enemy of privacy was
not the press or newspapers, but rather the English Star Chamber.179 He
did not put together the history of patents and copyrights in England to
175. Compare supra note 174, with Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 211 n.1 (citing Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
176. Compare Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 (affirming George Washington’s descendible, common
law copyright in the letters he wrote), followed by Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 971 (C.C.D. Ohio
1849) (No. 1,076), with 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166, at 999–1000 (“If there be such a right
at common law, the crown is an usurper; but there is no such right at common law, which declares it
a monopoly; no such action lies; resort must be had to the crown in all such cases. . . . It was not for
gain, that Bacon, Newton, Milton, Locke, instructed and delighted the world; it would be unworthy
[of] such men to traffic with a dirty bookseller for such much a sheet of a letter press. When the
bookseller offered Milton five pound for his Paradise Lost, he did not reject it, and commit his poem
to the flames, nor did he accept the miserable pittance as the reward for his labour; he knew that the
real price of his work was immortality, and that posterity would pay it.”). But Milton did claim that the
crown was a usurper for profiting upon his works without permission. See JOHN MILTON,
EIKONOKLASTES 13 (2d ed. 1650) (referring to the monarch’s stealing of the property of “every
author” as an illegitimate taxation saying “any King heretofore that made a levy upon their wit, and
seized it as his own legitimate” is an illegitimate taxation that was “a trespass also more than usual
against human right”).
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The copy
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.”);
2 JAMES WILSON, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1080 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David
Hall eds., 2007) (“[T]he common law abhors all monopolies.”); see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 552 (2013) (noting Madison’s successful defense of common law copyright against
Thomas Jefferson’s fervent attacks).
178. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 200, 205 n.1 (observing that authors own
copyrights but not explaining why).
179. See id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and decency.”); see also 1 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF
ENGLAND 335–36 (1849) (noting how “illegal proclamations were issued, to be enforced in the Star
Chamber” without the permission of Parliament for taxes on royal enemies like Lord Coke, according
to which Lord Coke’s residence was ordered to be “search[ed] for seditious papers, and, if any were
found, to arrest the author”—when the police arrived they found Lord Coke on his death-bed and
nevertheless searched his house took several important papers that were hidden from the public and
censored by the crown).
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show Americans how they were used to dominate the printing presses prior
to the rise of common law.180 Brandeis did not show us how the American
Revolutionaries followed Coke’s lead to vindicate author-owned copyrights
at common law.181
Prior to the American Revolution, copyright was not owned by authors
as commemorated in both Donaldson and Millar.182 The Founders
discovered, to their dismay, that Lord Coke’s opinions were despised and
limited in England.183 In the time of The Case of Monopolies, copyrights were
patents, i.e., there was a royal patent for the use of printing presses bestowed
upon the Stationer’s Company to censor English speech—the first “copyright.”184
While Lord Coke’s right of life—valiantly declared in The Case of
Monopolies—might have naturally been extended in England to author180. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 196; see CHARLES ROBERT RIVINGTON, THE
RECORDS OF THE WORSHIPFUL COMPANY OF STATIONERS 25–26 (1883) (explaining that English
copyright and patent was first developed as a royal strategy to police speech—especially religious
speech).
181. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193 (citing to Millar and several other English
decisions, but not mentioning Lord Coke, despite his chief role in the development of patent and
copyright common law in England and America); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (vindicating
the Case and Statute of Monopolies, which began the shift to inventor owned patents, and by later
extension author owned copyrights); 1 CAMPBELL, supra note 179, at 335–36.
182. See Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2312–14 (Eng.) (identifying this case might have
created a common law, author owned copyright for the first time), overruled by Proceedings in the Lords
on the Question of Literary Property [in Donaldson v. Becket], Feb. 4–22, 1774, in 17 THE
PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166, at 992. The Americans disagreed about this vital issue, though in a
very subtle way. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), followed by
Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 971 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076).
183. Compare 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83 (arguing that the Statute of Monopolies
(1623) secured the common law by precluding non-common law tribunals like the Star Chamber from
issuing patents to non-inventors for potentially unlimited times), with 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY,
supra note 166, at 994 (“The two sole titles by which a man secured his right was the royal patent and
the licence of the Stationers’ Company; I challenge any man alive to shew me any other right or title.
Where is it to be fund? some of the learned judges say the words ‘ or otherwise’ in the statute of queen
Anne relate to a prior common law right? To what common law right could these words refer?”
Lord Camden went further, willfully ignoring Lord Coke’s checks upon the king that led to the English
Civil War, stating that “the corrupt judges of the times submitted to the arbitrary law of prerogative”).
Cf. Case of Proclamations (1610) 12 Co. Rep. 74, 76 (Eng.) (Lord Coke firmly stated that “the law of
England is divided into three parts: common law, statute law, and custom; but the King’s proclamation
is none of them”).
184. RIVINGTON, supra note 180, at 2–3. See 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166,
at 993–94 (“The manner in which the copy-right was held was a kind of copyhold tenure, in which the
owner has a title by custom only, at the will and pleasure of the lord. The two sole titles by which a
man secured his right was the royal patent and the licence of the Stationers’ Company. . . .”);
3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *181–83.
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owned copyrights as they originally emanated from patents, they were
emphatically not.185 The Star Chamber staunchly defended the royal power
to censor religious texts under canon law.186 The alleged necessity of canon
law to protect England from heresy supported feudal claims of copyright
that would later shape the English Court.187
Copyrights developed as a separate entity for the specific purpose of
denying the author’s common law rights of life once declared by Lord Coke
on behalf of inventors.188 Thus, John Milton died a poor man with close
to nothing to pass on to his daughters as an inheritance.189 Milton
characterized his proprietors’ violation of common law copyright to profit
from the works of his hands as a taxation without representation,190 a
phrase adopted by James Otis a century later.191
Yesteryear’s literary agents, known as proprietors, were granted
copyrights from the crown as feudal titles are granted to lands.192 The
proprietors, not the authors, sued in Millar and Donaldson to defend their
feudal titles as if they were derived from the common law.193 Though
common law precedent can be heard in the opinions of Millar and Donaldson,
they were constrained by the fact that the authors were not a party to those
decisions.194
185. The Case of Monopolies [1602] 11 Co. Rep. 84b (Eng.); Statute of Monopolies 1623,
21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). See supra note 183.
186. RIVINGTON, supra note 180, at 2–3; 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166, at 993–94.
187. See 1 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF
LONDON, 1554–1640 A.D., at 52 (Edward Arber ed., 1875) (providing an example of a royal
proclamation censoring books and writings that may be imported or printed in England). From the
old English proclamations arose a presumption in English law that survived Lord Coke’s
countermovement and became the basis of a wide array of state actions, including the censorship of
North Briton No. 45 through actions of seditious libel. See also Leach v. Money (1763) 19 How. St. Trials
981, 1026 (Eng.); cf. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1204–07 (2016).
188. See 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166, at 993–94 (“The manner in which the copyright was held was a kind of copyhold tenure.”); MILTON, supra note 176, at 13.
189. SAMUEL JOHNSON, LIVES OF THE POETS 100 (1826); 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY,
supra note 166, at 1000.
190. MILTON, supra note 176, at 13.
191. PARKER P. SIMMONS, JAMES OTIS’S SPEECH ON THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE. 1761., at 23
(Albert Bushnell Hart & Edward Channing eds., 1906).
192. 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 166, at 993–94.
193. Id. at 992, 933–94.
194. See id. at 1000 (noting that “the present proprietors pretend to derive that copy from them,
for which the author himself never received a farthing”—arguably distinguishing Donaldson from any
future case in which an actual author claimed his copyright at common law); id. at 978 (naming a
common law right of authorial attribution as the basis of common law copyright); id. at 997 (“[A]n
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In the years between Millar and Donaldson, the common law of authorowned copyrights was litigated in America alongside the separation of
In pre-revolutionary
powers in the trial of Phillis Wheatley.195
Massachusetts Bay, Governor and Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson
managed to accumulate ultimate power over all three branches of
government.196 When the first bill for an author-owned copyright in the
entire Western World was passed in the legislature of Massachusetts Bay,
Hutchinson used his accumulated powers to preempt the law.197
Due to this unjust result of Hutchinson’s accumulation of ultimate
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in Massachusetts Bay, the entire
government of the colony was put in an uproar and prorogued to debate
the governor’s power and the legal rights of authors.198 This short era was
a silent court period where Chief Justice Hutchinson presided over a great
debate at Harvard College.199 After Hutchinson sided with the crown to
abridge American rights, Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Adams became
whistleblowers of Hutchinson’s secret plans, and the American Revolution
commenced.200
However, there is more to the story, had Justice Brandeis cared to look
closer.201 Prior to the silent court period, William Billings’ artistic colleague,
a young black slave girl named Phillis Wheatley gained worldwide renown

action [at common law], I allow, will lie for ink and paper.”); Millar v. Taylor [1769] 4 Burr. 2303, 2316
(Eng.) (naming the author’s contract with their proprietor/agent a common law basis of copyright).
See also Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 968 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076) (“We have to say
whether the writer has a right of property in his own manuscripts. That he has such a property in his
own literary labor, until he shall relinquish it by contract or by some unequivocal act, would seem to
be clear.”).
195. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 160–64 n.914.
196. See SIMMONS, supra note 191, at 9 (“In the interval, Chief Justice Sewall died, and
Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson was made his successor, thereby uniting in his person, the office of
Lieutenant Governor with the emoluments of the commander of the castle, a member of the Council,
Judge of Probate and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court!”).
197. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 160–61.
198. Id. at 160–64.
199. Id. at 161–64 n.914; JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1772–1773, at 134–35, 137 (1980).
200. See THE LETTERS OF GOVERNOR HUTCHINSON AND LIEUT. GOVERNOR OLIVER, & C.
PRINTED AT BOSTON 92, 110 (2d ed., 1776) (noting that Franklin was key to sending the letters to
Samuel Adams in America); id. at 16, 59, 64 (demonstrating the Americans took most umbrage against
Hutchinson’s statement “there must be an abridgment of what are called English Liberties” which, in America,
had come to include the natural rights of humankind).
201. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 161.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

39

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

362

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

for writing an elegy for Reverend Whitefield.202 Then in 1772, during the
silent court period, a dispute over whether Wheatley was the actual author
of her poems electrified the Colony of Massachusetts Bay.203
While the entire colony was prorogued to debate the separation of
powers, Phillis Wheatley was tried by a Court of Chief Justice Hutchinson
regarding her attribution rights.204 The Court was split almost evenly
between revolutionaries and royalists, and unanimously decided in
Wheatley’s favor.205 This was the first common law precedent in the
Western World in favor of a common law copyright originally owned by
authors, and it was, if one searches even further, the first example of actual
Lockean property rights to exist in the West.206
Phillis Wheatley received an attestation from the unanimous court to be
published in her book of poems as the basis of her copyright.207 She took
this attestation and her poetry to England and placed her book in the
Stationer’s Company’s ledger one year prior to Donaldson’s overruling of
Millar.208 Then she imported her books, according to her common law
rights, into America on the famous ship of tea that was offloaded into the
Boston Harbor.209
Nobody in the English-speaking world had yet accomplished this feat
prior to Phillis Wheatley, and all afterward took for granted her success.210
She was so forgotten that Justice Brandeis managed to cite Millar and Star
202. Phillis Wheatley, An Elegiac Poem, on the Death of that Celebrated Divine, and Eminent Servant of
Jesus Christ, the Late Reverend, and Pious George Whitefield [ 1770].
203. Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in PHILLIS WHEATLEY,
POEMS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, RELIGIOUS AND MORAL 7 (1773). Cf. Matilda, On Reading the Poems of
Phillis Wheatley, the African Poetess, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 1796.
204. See Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 161 (“Loyalist and revolutionary miraculously
united to secure Phillis Wheatley a right of attribution to the works of her hands.”).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 183.
207. Id. at 161; Thomas Hutchinson, C.J., et al., To the Public, [Oct. 1772,] in WHEATLEY,
supra note 203, at 7.
208. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 166–67.
209. Id. at 175. Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (vindicating
the common law right to import and export copyrighted goods for a profit, stating that “‘[W]hen a
statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,’ it is presumed that ‘Congress intended
to retain the substance of the common law.’”) (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320, n.13
(2010)).
210. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 21, 151. Cf. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 552 (considering
Jefferson and Madison regarding the scope and contours of copyright, without considering the
founding poetess Phillis Wheatley, who was arguably the most important figure on the topic of
founding copyright law).
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Chamber precedent for his rights of privacy.211 Had he only looked a little
closer Brandeis might have found the Afric Muse, to whom we owe our
common law copyrights, extended by Justice Story in Folsom as a privacy
right in mail.212
Today we have the benefit of even more hindsight: we now know that
the United States regulation of telecommunications is to respect the general
public’s First Amendment rights, including privacy rights.213 Brandeis’
analogy of telephones-as-mail in Olmstead became real when the
Communications Act of 1934 was passed, as it was inspired by the sinking
of the Titanic, a mail delivery ship that might not have sunk if public interest
emergency regulations were established at that time.214
Brandeis did not have the benefit of knowing that updates to this
telecommunications law would later oversee development of radio,
television, the internet, and emails under the public interest standard and
common carrier common law.215 Therefore, some grace may be given to
Brandeis for failing to celebrate the trial of Phillis Wheatley, whose common
law copyrights were exported to England and imported back into America
under common carrier common law.216 However, no grace should extend
211. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 151 (“a curtain of forgetfulness is drawn over the
‘magic power’ of Phillis Wheatley’s verse.”); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 193.
212. Compare Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 169–70, 210 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 347 (C.C.D. Mass. 841) (No. 4,901)), with Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 211 n.1
(citing Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346).
213. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (interpreting the
Communications Act of 1934 to encompass First Amendment rights of people viewing and listening
to content distributed through telecommunications networks).
214. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927); Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
See Smithsonian: National Postal Museum, Fire & Ice: Hindenburg and Titanic: Titanic’s Mail Clerks,
https://postalmuseum.si.edu/exhibition/fire-ice-hindenburg-and-titanic-exhibition-ice-the-titanic-dis
aster/titanic%E2%80%99s-mail-clerks [https://perma.cc/94Y6-E8LJ] (“Titanic had five sea post
clerks aboard: three Americans and two British.”); Mathew Lasar, How the Titanic Disaster Pushed
Uncle Sam to Rule the Air, ARSTECHNICA (July 7, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2011/07/did-the-titanic-disaster-let-uncle-sam-take-over-the-airwaves/ [https://perma.cc/E2
8W-VGD5] Interestingly, Justice Holmes decided The Titanic, where he upheld the anti-common law
American deregulation of the high seas, apparently according to an implied repeal of common law
choice of laws principles that disfavored applying British law to the detriment of the American
claimants. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic), 233 U.S. 718, 734 (1914).
215. Compare Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 211, with National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 238 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting to express common carrier
provisions in the telecommunications law).
216. Cf. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538, 541–42 (2013). How far this
grace should extend is debatable, especially since Brandeis had the legal/historical evidence completely
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to Brandeis for his ironic endorsement of Justice Holmes’ opinion in Buck
v. Bell, a horrendous stain on Brandeis’ jurisprudence.217
The amount of contradictory logic deployed in Buck and Olmstead is
overwhelming.218 In Olmstead, Justice Brandeis departed from his idea,
earlier published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890, of an inherent, human
right of privacy.219 Especially in the light of Buck, Brandeis’ privacy rights
did not protect imbeciles, homosexuals, women, or non-white people,
which strained the conception of human rights to the point of
nonexistence.220
Brandeis nevertheless appeared to invent a protection for substantive
constitutional rights in his Olmstead dissent, something Holmes labeled
penumbral.221 Brandeis cited Buck v. Bell in support of his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States, because in Olmstead federal officers were tapping
phone lines in violation of state criminal law.222 Justice Holmes agreed with
Brandeis’ use of Buck, but broke away from Justice Brandeis by disclaiming
Brandeis’ idea that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments embraced human
rights,
I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments covers the defendant . . . .
But I think, as
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS says, that apart from the Constitution the

available to him. Compare Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161, at 212, with WHEATLEY, supra note 203,
at 7, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thomas Jefferson and The Trials of Phillis Wheatley, C-SPAN (Mar. 22, 2002),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?169288-1/thomas-jefferson-trials-phillis-wheatley.
217. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), cited in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
218. Compare Buck, 274 U.S. at 207–08 (upholding a state statute as to the individual), with
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468–69 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (disregarding a state statute as to the police).
219. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (oxymoronically citing Buck v. Bell, a horrendous
violation of any idea of privacy by the government, in support of privacy rights granted by state statute);
see also id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the right of privacy as is “the right most valued
by civilized men”).
221. Compare id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution . . . . sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.”), with id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I am not prepared to
say that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant . . . .”).
222. Id. at 472, 475–76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The evil incident to invasion of the privacy
of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails.”).
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Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a
criminal act.223

Holmes argued that the Government should not “play an ignoble part” by
committing crimes, but also that the Bill of Rights should be irrelevant to
that conclusion.224 What mattered to Justice Holmes was only what the
state law said, but he agreed with the majority that the United States
Constitution did not protect the defendants.225 Decades later, not even
Justice Scalia agreed with Holmes’ Olmstead dissent, as Scalia demonstrated
in Kyllo v. United States.226
A long line of cases led to Scalia’s admirable common law decision in
Kyllo.227 First, the Court eventually restored the exclusionary rule in Mapp
v. Ohio, quoting a passage from Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent,228 and then it
overruled Olmstead in Katz citing to Brandeis’ common law ideas published
at Harvard rather than his Olmstead dissent.229 This line of cases seemed to
reach its pinnacle in Terry v. Ohio, which shifted focus from the question of
merely whether Fourth Amendment rights exist to the scope of those rights
saying,
We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,’ and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of
privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.230

The Court also pressed forward into the penumbra in Griswold v. Connecticut
citing to Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent;231 in Roe v. Wade also citing Brandeis’

223. Id. at 469–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 470 (Holmes. J. dissenting).
225. Id. at 469–70 (Holmes. J. dissenting).
226. Compare id. at 470 (Holmes. J. dissenting) (endorsing a right of privacy, but only in so far
as it was enacted by state law), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (creating a common
law rule far broader than the one established in Boyd, which originally overruled a state law as
unconstitutional as a plain trespass under the Fourth Amendment).
227. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–32 (referencing this line, stemming from Boyd).
228. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
229. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.6 (1967) (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 161, at 193).
230. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 361).
231. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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Olmstead dissent;232 and again in Lawrence v. Texas overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, which again cited to Brandeis’ Olmstead dissent.233 All these cases
paved the way to Obergefell v. Hodges, which again cited to Brandeis’ Olmstead
dissent.234 However, the Court retained ulterior reasons for overruling the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in Windsor v. United States as a violation
of equal rights rather than a violation of penumbral privacy rights.235
All this to say, Holmes’ view about the penumbra being off limits was
repeatedly reversed in favor of Brandeis’ penumbral approaches.236
However, the Court never addressed how both Brandeis and Holmes’ views
were furthered by Buck v. Bell’s vindication of state police powers.237 It also
never addressed whether Katz’s cite to Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review article,
The Right to Privacy, was substantially different from relying on Brandeis’
endorsement of Buck in Olmstead.238
Brandeis’ legacy seemed to be subsumed by Holmes’ obsession with the
penumbra, abgrund, or abyss—a quasi-religious legal strategy Brandeis never
fully adopted.239 Holmes’ arbitrary preferences for law and procedure were
232. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
233. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should
have been controlling in Bowers and should control here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled.”), extending Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
234. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666–67 (2015) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
235. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013); cf. Smith v. Board of Examiners of
Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 54–55 (1913) (extending the federal Equal Protection Clause to outlaw
eugenic sterilization in New Jersey).
236. See supra notes 226–234 and accompanying text.
237. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
The closest the Court got was: Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority
may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority—even those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes.”).
238. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. Compare Warren & Brandeis, supra note 161,
at 193 (describing the changing scope of fundamental rights over time), with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the Framers’ prospective expectations for Fourth Amendment
privacy rights).
239. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’ Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643,
644 n.3, 648 (2007) (accepting the sleight of hand accomplished by Griswold as if Brandeis thought of
human rights as penumbral, when he may not have). See supra notes 40, 94–96; Holmes, Law in Science,
supra note 28, at 457 (stating Holmes’ penumbral theory that appears to be strongly influenced by
Hegelian magical thinking). Cf. JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS 9–11, 67, 146–49,
153, 205–06 (2010) (devoting several passages to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and again seeming to
extend Holmes’ penumbra over Brandeis’ views).
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rehashed in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,240 and
Castle Rock v. Gonzales.241 A Hegelian negative versus positive rights
distinction was recently asserted to blame the constitution for these
miscarriages of justice, rather than the flawed character of the judges
themselves.242
With the false dichotomies of Hegel in mind, Eric Voegelin wrote that
“[o]nce you have entered the magic circle the sorcerer has drawn around

240. Compare DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)
(rejecting expansion of substantive due process to include positive duties), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927) (appearing to invent the concept of substantive due process in an attempt to preclude
it), and Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 27, at 457 (reflecting on the gradation of penumbral legal
theories). Holmes is often seen as a critic of substantive due process, but it appears he was the
originator of the concept of substantive due process in order to cancel judicial review of most due
process. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923) (when exercising what would later
be labeled substantive due process, Justice Sutherland noted that there was no such distinction at the
time: “This is not the exercise of a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for no
such substantive power exists.”); id. at 568–69 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (comparing Court’s expansion
of substantive due process rights to untenable Court decisions protecting right to contract). See also
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (attempting to demonstrate that
the Due Process Clause “was [not] intended to give us carte blanche to” apply what was later referred to
as substantive due process); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining the sole
reason Holmes distinguished himself from Brandeis was because Brandeis expounded substantive due
process ideas in an attempt to uphold a state law in this case—it didn’t matter if it upheld or overruled
a law, Holmes would not endorse the concept of what would later be called substantive due process);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (equating written laws of a state
or of Congress with the “dominant opinion” of the American people in order to hold that due process
is “perverted” whenever it is used to overrule a law—thus, it appears that Holmes created a distinction
between procedural due process and substantive due process in order to obstruct or even put an end
to substantive due process).
241. Compare Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755–56 (2005) (distinguishing substantive
and procedural due process), with Buck, 274 U.S at 207 (delineating substantive due process), and
Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 457 (espousing precursor to penumbral due process legal
theory).
242. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 241–44, 311, 323–25
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (discussing his dichotomy of positive versus negative
rights); Miccio, supra note 65, at 296 (noting that “the negative/positive rights debate” has
“[e]verything” to do with the miscarriage of justice in Castle Rock, which is completely accurate,
Professor Miccio also diagnosed the problem to be that the Justices on the Court “adhere[] to a negative
rights standard” in their constitutional interpretation, not that the U.S. Constitution is actually a
negative-rights-only constitution—this means that if the U.S. Constitution is flawed, its flaws lie in the
structure of the U.S. Supreme Court, which allowed it to fall victim to false Hegelian dichotomies,
rather than in the structure of the Bill of Rights per se); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”).
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himself, you are lost.”243 Hegelianism, a derivative of Hobbesian
philosophy, defined terms in a way that made desired conclusions
inescapable.244 Once these false dichotomies were accepted by opponents,
like Hobbes’ Puritans who embraced pride and dejection as if they were
virtues, the tyrannical conclusions they were designed to wreak must
follow.245
Thus, Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead, which accepted Holmes’
presuppositions in Buck v. Bell for support, obviously cannot overcome Buck
v. Bell.246 One can, as the Court appeared to do in Katz, attempt to
distinguish Brandeis’ common law arguments from his Olmstead dissent to
create ulterior common law grounds, but this too lands the Court no further
than the Star Chamber.247 Brandeis’ good intentioned ideas may be
unworkable, at least wherever they accepted Hobbesian or Hegelian
premises.248
The most memorable quote from Brandeis’ richly written dissent in
Olmstead was probably that the right of privacy is “the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”249 Unwitting or not,
243. ERIC VOEGELIN, On Hegel: A Study in Sorcery, in 12 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ERIC VOEGELIN 228 (1990).
244. See supra notes 21, 93–94 and accompanying text; RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 22,
at 733–35 (discussing several of Hegel’s dichotomies, between subjective vs. objective and Gegenstand
vs. Objekt, from which Hegel claimed to derive the Absolute Idea); id. at 738–40 (noting Hegel’s
celebration of violence and war, and his ideology’s vestiges in Hobbesian state-worship); RUSSELL,
UNPOPULAR, supra note 19, at 22–23 (discussing Hegel’s “dialectic”); id. at 122–23 (noting that if
Hobbes “had been alive in 1940, he would have found ample confirmation of his contention [that
people should reverence the government however unworthy it might be] in the devotion of German
youth to the Nazis”); cf. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 57 (Eleanor Worthington trans., D.C.
Heath & Co. ed., 1889) (giving the French despot Robespierre a philosophy to follow when he said,
“Forgive my paradoxes, . . . I prefer paradoxes to prejudices”).
245. See RUSSELL, A HISTORY, supra note 22, at xxii (noting that the doctrines of “Hobbes,
Rousseau, and Hegel . . . are embodied practically in Cromwell, Napoleon, and modern Germany,”
i.e., Hitler). Compare HOBBES, supra note 18, at 46–48 (maintaining pride is a form of madness), with
Instrument of Government (Dec. 16, 1653), in 2 ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM,
1642–60, at 813–22 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911) (discussing England’s first written constitution,
installing Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector with supreme legislative and executive powers), with
John Milton, Samson Agonistes 144, 865–68, 1639–68 [1671] (adopting a Hobbesian public/private
dichotomy to justify mass killings as a way of castrating a people and a mass terrorist suicide death for
the same purpose of completing an act of sexual violence against women).
246. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 229, 238, and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). Cf. Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 28, at 457.
249. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Brandeis’ opinions became a mere right to privacy emanating from the
penumbra that protected only “civilized men,” i.e., rich white men.250 The
rights Brandeis described were not for women, non-white people, and were
especially not for imbeciles or mentally disturbed individuals, including
homosexuals and other nonconforming individuals, who were all
considered, in Brandeis’ day, to be uncivilized.251
Brandeis was the first and only Jew on the U.S. Supreme Court in his day,
but in a time when even Helen Keller supported eugenics it is hard to place
too much significance on Brandeis’s Jewishness.252 As James Baldwin
attested in a fiery piece that ran in the New York Times Negroes are AntiSemitic Because They’re Anti-White, while Jews eventually became the target of
eugenic persecution, in America they were seen as white people and like
Brandeis they largely enjoyed the spoils of racial injustice and did not
perceive that they could be the target of a genocide.253 In the more recent
250. Compare id. (protecting a man’s right to privacy), with Buck, 274 U.S. at 207, and Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (deciding, essentially, that women’s liberty of contract may be
violated by the states, where men’s liberty of contract may not).
251. Compare Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (refusing to extend substantive due process protection to
mentally ill woman), with Muller, 208 U.S. at 423 (refusing to extend the right to contract to women
the same as to men), and W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 395 (1937) (unflatteringly stating
such things like, “referring to a differentiation with respect to the employment of women, we said that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere with state power by creating a ‘fictitious equality’”)
(quoting Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912), wherein Justice Holmes wrote the opinion,
in which he also hinted that the Equal Protections Clause may properly be ignored when considering
the claims of Chinese Americans)). Cf. NOURSE, supra note 129, at 68 (“Buck v. Bell was a progressive
decision, in line with a variety of others in which Holmes and Brandeis would lead the charge by urging
deference to popular majorities”).
252. Revisiting The Tenure Of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, The ‘Jewish Jefferson’, NPR: FRESH
AIR (June 7, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481076322/revisiting-the-tenure-ofsupreme-court-justice-louis-brandeis-the-jewish-jeffers [https://perma.cc/9WT5-JNKV]; The Helen
Keller Exorcism, THE EXPERIMENT PODCAST (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.wnycstudios.org/
podcasts/experiment/episodes/helen-keller-tiktok-conspiracy-fraud [https://perma.cc/GM9H-WV
3Y] (presenting a debate regarding whether Hellen Keller actually withdrew her support for eugenics,
but those debating the topic admitted that at least for a time “Helen supported eugenics”).
253. See James Baldwin, Negroes Are Anti-Semitic Because They’re Anti-White, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 1967), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/29/specials/baldwinantisem.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/53GM-MQY3] (“[M]any Jews despise Negroes, even as their
Aryan brothers do. (There are also Jews who despise other Jews, even as their Aryan brothers do.)
It is true that many Jews use, shamelessly, the slaughter of the 6,000,000 by the Third Reich as proof
that they cannot be bigots—or in the hope of not being held responsible for their bigotry. It is galling
to be told by a Jew whom you know to be exploiting you that he cannot possibly be doing what you
know he is doing because he is a Jew.”); cf. BLACKKKLANSMAN (Focus Features 2018) (telling the
amazing true story of a black man Ron Stallworth whose Jewish colleague Phillip Zimmerman helped
him infiltrate the KKK at great risk to his own life, by using his white skin color to pose as a white

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

370

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

words of Emma Green for The Atlantic, “From the earliest days of the
American republic, Jews were technically considered white, at least in a legal
sense. Under the Naturalization Act of 1790, they were considered among
the ‘free white persons’ who could become citizens.”254
C. HOW THE RECONSTRUCTION COURT INSPIRED JUSTICE POWELL
TO RESURRECT BUCK V. BELL
After the Civil War, almost the entire membership of the Taney Court
filtered out by death or retirement and a Court shaped by the North presided
over Reconstruction.255 This first crop of postbellum jurists did not
describe why Dred Scott and its progeny were not a legitimate or “due”
constitutional framework.256 Instead, they made a horcrux for Dred Scott in
The Slaughterhouse Cases by endorsing Dred Scott’s false version of the United
States’ social compact.257
supremacist—where Zimmerman was not clocked as a person of color or a Jew). Another important
episode that demonstrated that American Jews did not generally perceive the danger of Nietzsche and
the Übermensch ideology to the Jewish diaspora was the Loeb & Leopold murder trial. See supra notes
82–83 and accompanying text.
254. Emma Green, Are Jews White?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/are-jews-white/509453/ [https://perma.cc/P5MF-FPCJ].
255. Together, Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant appointed nine United States Supreme
Court Justices, reconfiguring the Court from around 1862 to 1874. Justices 1789 to Present, U.S. SUP.
CT, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/4PGM-A5GV];
see Calvin Schermerhorn, Packing the Court: Amid National Crises, Lincoln and His Republicans Remade the
Supreme Court to Fit Their Agenda, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 12, 2020, 11:23 AM), https://theconver
sation.com/packing-the-court-amid-national-crises-lincoln-and-his-republicans-remade-the-supremecourt-to-fit-their-agenda-147139 [https://perma.cc/W5DM-5PAK] (discussing Lincoln and Grant’s
Supreme Court appointments).
256. Schermerhorn, supra note 255 (citing United States v. Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases,
Professor Schermerhorn wisely wrote, “careful what you wish for”). Perhaps the Reconstruction
Court’s most salient contribution, after the miscarriage of justice in the illegitimate military trial of Mary
Surratt, was Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), brought about by Lincoln’s changes to the judiciary.
See THE CONSPIRATOR (American Film Company, 2010).
257. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (referring to “the celebrated Dred Scott
case” favorably and, while acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment “overturns the Dred Scott
decision,” the Slaughterhouse Court reaffirmed Chief Justice Taney’s false presupposition in Dred Scott
that only rich white men were intended to be included in the original compact of 1776, in order to
demolish the rights of poor white men and arguably all men); id. at 105, 116–117 (Field, J., dissenting)
(arguing rights in the Declaration of Independence were limited to freedom of trade and contract).
The Court’s failure to affirmatively overrule Dred Scott’s presuppositions about the United States. social
compact, that caused the Civil War, resulted in further miscarriages of justice. See, e.g., Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (excluding women from suffrage and deciding along the lines of
Dred Scott’s narrow reading of the United States social compact “that the Constitution of the United
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone”) (emphasis added). But see LUCY STONE,
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The term “horcrux” is taken from the Harry Potter series.258 It refers to
dark magic that aims at granting its user immortality by fragmenting a dark
wizard’s soul and placing it in otherwise innocent objects, such as a diary or
locket, so that the dark wizard may be resurrected from death.259 The facial
innocence of the horcrux can ensnare otherwise unwilling participants into
completing the dark wizard’s plans, especially if the dark wizard is believed
to be dead.260
In the analogy of Slaughterhouse-as-horcrux, the proverbial dark wizard was
Dred Scott’s exclusion of African Americans from the founding compact.261
The innocent object used by Slaughterhouse to help Dred Scott live on, was the
idea of due process.262 Slaughterhouse adopted the very rationale stated in
WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN NEW JERSEY 1–12 (1867) (proving that the “consent of the governed”
mandated by THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) meant giving the vote to all
citizens by observing: “In New Jersey, women and negroes voted from 1776 to 1807, a period of thirtyone years.”). Stone faithfully described from the Constitution down to the law, that “all inhabitants”
of New Jersey were conferred “suffrage and ability to hold the highest office in the State.” Id. (quoting
N.J. CONST. OF 1776, § 4).
258. Sarah E. Light, Regulatory Horcruxes, 67 DUKE L.J. 1647, 1655 (2018).
259. Id. at 1656–57 n.29.
260. Id. at 1659 (for example, Lord Voldemort chose “a diary, a ring, a locket, a cup, and a
diadem”). Since Professor Light was advocating for the creation of “regulatory” horcruxes, she seemed
to shy away from describing the essential, deceptive nature of horcruxes. See Ginerva Weasley, HARRY
POTTER WIKI, https://harrypotter.fandom.com/wiki/Ginevra_Weasley [https://perma.cc/VSF6U7LM] (“Ginny . . . discovered Tom Riddle’s diary in amongst her school things and unaware of the
diary’s true nature, began writing in it. To her amazement, the diary wrote back, and she started to
confide in Tom Riddle’s memory . . . .”).
261. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (“[T]he language used in the Declaration
of Independence, show[s] that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument”).
262. Id. at 450; see also Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 80–82 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause “has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth amendment,” and as
such it “has practically been the same as it now is during the existence of the government” and stating:
“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision.” Essentially, this holds that Dred Scott was right about black people not being included in
the idea of all men being equal in the Declaration of Independence by giving the Fourteenth
Amendment the sole purpose of including black men rather than finding that the Fourteenth
Amendment stands as a testament to Dred Scott’s error for depriving non-white people of all stripes
from their rights, which contradicts the original intentions of the Declaration of Independence);
cf. Pauli Murray, An American Credo, 5 COMMON GROUND 22, 24 (1945) (“When my brothers try to
draw a circle to exclude me, I shall draw a larger circle to include them. Where they speak out for the
privileges of a puny group, I shall shout for the rights of all mankind . . . . With humility but with pride
I shall offer one small life, whether in foxhole or in wheatfield, for whatever it is worth, to fulfill the
prophecy that all men are created equal.”).
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Dred Scott while simultaneously maintaining that Dred Scott was dead, making
Slaughterhouse Dred Scott’s horcrux.263
Prior to Crowell v. Benson’s due process framework based in common law
de novo review,264 the Court was stuck in old slavery ideas extended by
The Slaughterhouse Cases.265 Accordingly, Buck v. Bell extended no due process
prior to allowing doctors to perform horrific, unwanted surgeries in
furtherance of eugenics.266 Under Buck and Olmstead,267 United States
citizens were arguably given fewer rights than immigrants under Chae Chan
Ping.268
To explain how this may be so, it is important to remember that prior to
the Immigration Act of 1924 America had no general visa system such that
there was still an open door to most immigrants,269 and as such, in its time,
Chae Chan Ping dealt with a subset of immigrants that were targeted by
Congress for unjust exclusion.270 The Chae Chan Ping Court unjustly upheld
Chinese exclusion, but preserved a due process right to challenge legal errors
including to show that an individual immigrant was not a member of the
263. Supra notes 260–262.
264. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 58–59 (1932).
265. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 105, 77–82 (disregarding the Civil Rights Act of 1870 against state
laws that allegedly recreated a system of involuntary servitude through monopolies), extended in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (developing the idea of “liberty of contract” from
Slaughterhouse’s disregard for the right of United States citizens not to be enslaved). See Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (following Allgeyer, and by transitive horcrux through Slaughterhouse, Dred
Scott, by completely disregarding the fundamental right of workers to make a living wage in a safe work
environment, which was the original right of life exclaimed by the Case of Monopolies that Slaughterhouse
scandalously rejected); cf. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 3, at 274–76 (explaining the original
conception of “the rights of ordinary working people as a right of life”).
266. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
267. See id. (upholding and affirming state laws under the constitution that violate the
fundamental right of privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–65 (1928) (allowing police
to violate state laws to invade the privacy of citizens with illegal wiretapping).
268. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). As horrible as this case and
its progeny were, the Court did carve out an exception to immigration laws that preserved the judicial
power to “pass upon the validity of laws,” by construing Congress’s delegation of the power to make
determinations of final determinations narrowly. Id. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 660 (1892) (limiting, in an immigration case, the finality of decisionmaking by which Congress can
delegate to administrative tribunals to the facts and preserving the Court’s power to determine the law),
superseded by statute as stated in Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1978–79, 1983
(2020) (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . does not require review of [the immigration] determination or
how it was made.”).
269. See Closing the Door on Immigration, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.
nps.gov/articles/closing-the-door-on-immigration.htm [https://perma.cc/5JZY-DA2F] (citing
Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153).
270. Compare id., with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
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class of Chinese people the law targeted for exclusion,271 while Buck and
Olmstead denied due process rights generally to all U.S. citizens preserving no
right to privacy in order to prove, for example, that one is not feebleminded
or insane.272 By struggling against the unjust, eugenic immigration system,
naturalized U.S. citizens managed to vindicate their right to prove their
citizenship in U.S. court to avoid deportation, which was eventually
extended in Crowell to vindicate a general U.S. citizen’s right to de novo review
in cases involving fundamental rights including the right to privacy.273
Crowell can be read as a correction of Buck and Olmstead,274 in line with
Moore v. Dempsey’s correction of Frank v. Mangum,275 requiring common law
de novo review.276 The Crowell Court cited de novo review in federal
matters.277 Prior to the eugenic era, Justice Brandeis observed that statutes
routinely underwent this review as in Boyd v. United States, “a case that will
be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States.”278
Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis ironically defended the eugenic era’s
version of due process in his Crowell dissent.279 Justice Powell, the author
of Mathews, fashioned his definition of due process after the feigned judicial
restraint of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, as extended by Justice Stone in
United States v. Carolene Products.280 Footnote 4 of Carolene Products

271. See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“Jurisdiction in the executive to
order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial
of an essential jurisdictional fact.”); cf. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
272. See supra note 267.
273. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 60–61 (1932), quoting and extending Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922).
274. Crowell v, 285 U.S. at 60–61.
275. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–303 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (addressing
and adding to a list started by Justice Thomas, giving several decisions that applied de novo review in
habeas corpus cases, beginning with Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), and Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309 (1915)); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (stating “the claim is reviewed de novo.”); see also
O’Connor, They Often, supra note 79, at 394–96 (describing the significance of Moore and Frank).
276. Supra notes 274–275.
277. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 58–59.
278. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) Interestingly, Brandeis also wrote the opinion in Ng Fung Ho
that Crowell extended to U.S. citizens. See supra note 273.
279. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 80–81 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing against de novo review).
280. Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1089 (“When the Court invalidated legislation, Stone
frequently joined the Court’s aging giants, Holmes and Brandeis, in dissent.”). Justice Powell chose to
cite two cases from 1927, where Stone dissented with Holmes and Brandeis against the destruction of
state laws, but Powell deemphasized Buck v. Bell, as if Stone did not join Justice Holmes’ Buck opinion,
when he did. Id. at 1089 n.8, 1090 n.10 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
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theoretically replaced Lochner v. New York’s “substantive due process” review
with equal protection claims.281
The idea that Carolene Products’ footnoted dicta indicating future cases may
decide to use the Constitution to protect “discrete insular minorities”
somehow displaced Lochner substantive due process is absurd.282 It is
simply not anywhere in Carolene Products that equal protection should, or
even could, replace due process.283 Rather, Powell used his public relations
training to preserve both Buck v. Bell and Lochner, while making it appear as
though they passed away.284
In almost the same breath, Powell distanced himself from the very theory
he presented.285 Powell admitted that footnote 4 “is not a developed theory
in itself. Nor is there reason to think that Stone intended it to be.”286 In
this way, Powell put his theory for how to work around Lochner and Buck in
Justice Stone’s mouth, presented it, and then retracted any obligation on
Powell’s part to avoid the results of either Lochner or Buck.287
281. Id. at 1089–90 (“Stone lived to see—and indeed helped to preside over—the passing of
the Lochner era. The well-known turning point came in 1937, when the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state minimum wage law for women. Carolene Products was an otherwise
unremarkable decision in the same line. But Footnote 4 [of Carolene Products], as interpreted by many
commentators, represented a radical departure of its own. Far from initiating a jurisprudence of judicial
deference to political judgments by the legislature, Footnote 4—on this view—undertook to substitute
one activist judicial mission for another. . . . Where the Court before had used the substantive due
process clause to protect property rights, now it should use the equal protection clause . . . as a sword
with which to promote the liberty interests of groups disadvantaged by political decisions.”).
282. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Miccio, supra
note 65, at 296 (explaining the use of the word “substantive” in relation to due process is itself
“artificial”).
283. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 151 (explicitly rejecting equal protection claims under
federal statutes: “The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that of the
Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their Legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or
none.”); id. at 152 n.4 (not mentioning equal protection specifically).
284. See Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1089 (making the somewhat outlandish claim that
Justice Stone transcended his own opinions during the Lochner era to fashion a way of replacing
substantive due process associated with Lochner with equal protection ideology that was explicitly
rejected by Justice Stone in Carolene Products); id. at 1087 n.4 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979)) (“Professor Fiss, for example,
has termed Footnote 4 of Carolene Products ‘the great and modern charter for ordering the relations
between judges and other agencies of government.’”—this conclusion was, to be sure, shaped by
Justice Powell’s resurrection of footnote 4 of Carolene Products in Bakke).
285. Id. at 1090 (“Occasionally I think that Stone should be defended, not from his detractors,
but from his admirers.”).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1092 (Footnote 4 of Carolene Products is “perhaps the most farsighted dictum in our
modern judicial heritage. But, after all, it is dictum and was intended to be no more.”). Ergo, Powell’s
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Justice Powell relied on the Carolene Products footnote 4 theory in three
decisions authored by him: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,288
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,289 and Mathews v. Eldridge.290 In each
of these decisions, Justice Powell interpreted individual rights in a way that
Crowell v. Benson prohibited.291 Powell attempted to supplant Crowell by
ironically creating several Lochner horcruxes, feigning Crowell’s
nonexistence.292
Powell’s role of inventing shadow lines of case law to counter Crowell sub
silentio is extremely unsurprising given his authorship of the Powell
Memorandum.293 Among the Bernaysian strategies Powell pursued was

statements about “the passing of the Lochner era” and Justice Holmes’ infamous rejection of equal
protection claims in Buck v. Bell were premised on an extravagant dictum rather than actual law.
Id. at 1089–90 nn.9–10.
288. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288, 290 n.28, 291–92 (1978).
289. Compare First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786–87 (1978) (applying an
“exacting scrutiny” standard), with United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(considering the future adoption of a “more exacting judicial scrutiny”).
290. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330–32 (1976) (rejecting Eldridge’s
substantive due process claims and only considering procedural due process), with Powell, Jr., supra
note 53, at 1089–90 (describing how the era of substantive due process, i.e., the Lochner era, passed
away, in part, because Carolene Products theoretically supplanted it), and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (reviewing only for procedural due process and deciding “there is no doubt that in that respect
the plaintiff in error has had due process at law”).
291. Compare supra notes 289–91, with Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (refusing
“to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution”).
292. Compare Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1087 n.4 (quoting Fiss, supra note 284, at 6)
(supplanting Crowell sub silentio by citing footnote 4 of Carolene Products as “[t]he great and modern
charter for ordering the relation between judges and other agencies of government”), with James E.
Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643, 659–62, n.62 (2004) (noting “the significance of Crowell to the modern administrative state,”
consisted in “the widespread reliance on Crowell in crafting rules to govern the judicial review of agency
action”), and Crowell, 285 U.S. at 60–61 (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922) in
turn citing Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453, 461 (1908) (“[T]he law contemplates that he
shall be given the right of a hearing de novo before the district judge before he is ordered to be
deported.”))).
293. Powell’s secret memorandum can be seen as his secret audition to be lifted onto the bench
by President Richard Nixon so he could resurrect a Lochner 2.0 upon the first Lochner’s grave. Powell
Memo, supra note 47. Powell was nominated by President Nixon. President Richard Nixon, Address
to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to
be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Oct. 21, 1971),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-announcing-intention-nominatelewis-f-powell-jr-and-william-h-rehnquist [https://perma.cc/6ETG-QDEC].
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the engineering of consent,294 premised on Hobbesian force and fraud.295
The primary purpose of Powell’s decisions in Bakke, Bellotti, and Mathews,
were not to distinguish Lochner, but to reanimate Lochner with Bernaysinspired horcruxes.296
Justice Powell claimed Lochner was dead without overruling it,297 and
then remade Lochner just as Slaughterhouse remade Dred Scott.298 Powell
claimed that the era of substantive due process was over, but no United
States Supreme Court ever overruled Lochner on that basis.299 Rather,
Powell remade the Lochner era by referring to substantive due process only

294. Powell Memo, supra note 47, at 15–24 (Powell’s solutions listed under the title “What Can
Be Done About the Campus” and “What Can Be Done About the Public?” are candidly Bernaysian);
Edward Bernays, The Engineering of Consent (1947), in 250 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. &
SOC. SCI. 113, 113–14 (1947) (claiming the constitutional right of public relations counsels to
manipulate the American public, as if our constitutional system was indestructible).
295. Compare Powell Memo, supra note 47, at 15–24, and Bernays, supra note 294, at 113–14, with
JAMES OTIS, COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 241 (Richard Samuelson ed., 2015)
(disputing “Hobbesian maxims” including “[t]hat dominion is rightfully founded on force and fraud”),
and THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (requiring legitimate governments to
secure the consent of the governed).
296. See supra notes 288–290 and accompanying text. Especially Bakke, which secured
admission to medical school for a white man who was not a member of a discrete insular minority,
seemingly aligning with Bernays’s focus on Hawaii in order to advocate white supremacy. Compare
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978), with Edward Bernays, Public Relations
as Aid to Ethnic Harmony: Hawaii—The Almost Perfect State [1950], reprinted in BERNAYS, PUBLIC, supra
note 48, at 308 (“Hawaii is . . . the melting pot of the Pacific, assimilating people of Oriental
ancestry, . . . It is of further significance to the continental United States because it is setting a successful
pattern for the working out of maladjustments between people of diverse ethnic backgrounds.”).
Cf. The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, MLK: Proud To Be Maladjusted,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhCtkfImxuE [https://perma.cc/
K79Q-XP9A] (“I never intend to adjust myself to racial segregation and discrimination”).
297. Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1089.
298. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872))
(extending the Slaughterhouse holding which concluded the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
primarily to bridge “the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white ‘majority,’”
which was a subtle reiteration of Dred Scott’s holding that only rich white men were intended to be
included in the phrase “all men are created equal” written in the Declaration of Independence),
with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (“[T]he language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.”).
299. Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1089.
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when he wanted to deny rights,300 as the Court did in cases like
Slaughterhouse, Muller v. Oregon, and Buck v. Bell.301
Whether unwitting or not, Justice Powell liberally used Slaughterhouse as a
horcrux to resurrect the evils of the American past.302 His references to
Lochner as the definitive case of its time was itself a deception.303 Lochner
was a bad decision, but it existed alongside numerous bad decisions that
denied substantive rights to people regardless of whether the laws required
the protection of those rights or not.304
A closer look at Lochner, a case that overruled a state law enacted for the
protection of workers’ health and safety, reveals that Lochner

300. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330–31 (1976) (naming the distinction between
procedural and substantive due process in order to deny due process). Cf. Miccio, supra note 65, at 296
(arguing against continuing the distinction between procedural and substantive due process for the
reason stated above).
301. See Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 65–66 (denying substantive rights by referring to the “due”
processes Louisiana used to issue monopolies as if they “ha[ve] never been questioned or denied”);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420–23 (1908) (“[W]ithout questioning in any respect the decision in
Lochner v. New York, we are of the opinion that it cannot be adjudged that the act in question is in
conflict with the Federal Constitution . . . .”); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” (emphasis added)), extended in Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
302. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369 (quoting Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 71).
303. Powell, Jr., supra note 53, at 1089 (examining “the Lochner era, or the era of substantive due
process” without considering whether Buck v. Bell or Muller v. Oregon’s racist, misogynist, and ableist
denials of substantive due process might have characterized the era more honestly). Cf. Debs, 249 U.S.
at 216–17 (showing how Eugene Debs was destroyed by the government’s disregard for his substantive
rights, and the Court’s refusal to step in to defend Debs’ free speech rights was probably more
momentous of a decision than Lochner was); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (showing that substantive First
Amendment rights were not used to overrule the Espionage Act, while Holmes cited Congress’s
substantive right to punish speech instead).
304. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (disregarding substantive workers’ rights
that were intended to be secured by statute); Muller, 208 U.S. at 423 (denying liberty of contract to
women without disturbing Lochner), extended by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 394–95
(1937); Debs, 249 U.S. at 216–17; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (denying rights of
privacy and autonomy to women, homosexuals, non-white people, and imbeciles); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–65 (1928) (disregarding a state law designed to protect the privacy of
individuals); cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (extending Slaughterhouse to deny women
the right to practice law); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542–44 (1896) (extending Slaughterhouse to
affirm state power to enforce Jim Crow laws); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 271–72, 274–76 (1901)
(quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1856)). There are several other examples that may
be named.
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misapprehended workers’ substantive rights.305 The Lochner Court failed
to properly interpret state laws in light of all of the rights of workers.306
The problem with Lochner, made clear when Justice Holmes’ dissent in
Lochner became the law in Buck v. Bell, was its failure to find human rights
both relevant and controlling.307
Lochner’s misapprehension of human rights was first established in
Slaughterhouse, a decision that denied workers’ rights to avoid involuntary
servitude.308 The Slaughterhouse horcrux was later remade and strengthened
in Justice Powell’s three most salient contributions to federal
jurisprudence.309 Justice Powell made his inspirations so obvious that it
would be surprising if he did not simply lift all his central ideas directly from
Slaughterhouse.310
First, in Bakke Justice Powell successfully convinced a bare majority to
limit Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the words of the United
States Constitution.311 Powell used the United States Constitution to limit,
rather than expand, the breadth of rights that Congress could protect.312
Powell’s statutory construction was a remake of Slaughterhouse, which was a

305. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58 (disregarding the rights of workers secured by statute when
overruling state law), distinguishing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (disregarding
the rights of patients to refuse consent to receiving vaccines while affirming state law), extended by Buck,
274 U.S. at 207 (denying the right of innocent patients to refuse consent to being imprisoned and
sterilized).
306. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56–58 (disregarding the rights of workers), with Slaughterhouse ,
83 U.S. at 65–66 (disregarding the rights of workers).
307. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207, extending Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Jacobson should have been extended to affirm broad state powers).
308. Supra note 306.
309. See supra notes 288–290 and accompanying text.
310. Supra note 302.
311. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.)
(“[T]he voluminous legislative history of Title VI reveals a congressional intent to halt federal funding
of entities that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution.”);
id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (“Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies . . . .”).
312. Id. at 284; cf. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) (limiting the Civil Rights Act of 1870 to
the text of the constitution and refusing to become “a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens”), extended by Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883)
(using the constitution to limit the Civil Rights Act stating, “the law in question cannot be sustained by
any grant of legislative power made to Congress by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment”); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. at 51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)
(granting extremely broad latitude to Congress in its “choice of means”).
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remake of Dred Scott, to overrule rights enacted in positive laws “short of an
amendment to the Constitution.”313
This oxymoronic rule of construction alone is why the Civil Rights Act
during the time of Slaughterhouse did not protect workers under The Case of
Monopolies that formerly inspired the express adoption of the right of life in
the U.S. Constitution.314 The Slaughterhouse Court arbitrarily decided that
post-Fourteenth Amendment rights were less than those protected by the
This is how Slaughterhouse adopted the legal
Bill of Rights.315
presuppositions of Dred Scott to destroy human rights.316
Statutory construction that denies a statute’s existence apart from the U.S.
Constitution is imprudent judicial activism.317 The only question of a
statute’s existence should be whether the broad powers of Congress
according to McCulloch v. Maryland and Wickard v. Fillburn justify the
enactment.318 If it does, Congress may create new legal rights through the
enactment of laws according to the Ninth Amendment and under
constitutional avoidance doctrine.319
Constitutional avoidance requires that, if it is practically possible, the
Court should construe statutes in such a way that they do not violate the
U.S. Constitution.320 The Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
313. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 73; see supra notes 298, 311 and accompanying text.
314. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 65, 73; see supra note 265.
315. Slaughterhouse , 83 U.S. at 69 (using the Fourteenth Amendment to narrowly construe the
Civil Rights Act so that it may only be used to “to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery”);
cf. supra note 311.
316. Compare Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 69, and id. at 105 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)), with Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
407 (1856) (deciding that the Declaration of Independence was not intended to include black people,
in order to use the Fifth Amendment to limit any statutes that might include them).
317. Compare Slaughterhouses, 83 U.S. at 73 (using the Fourteenth Amendment to narrowly
construe the Civil Rights Act so that it may only be used to “forbid all shades and conditions of African
slavery”), with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Title VI
prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed
by a State or its agencies . . . .”).
318. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127
(1942).
319. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421, extended by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
654 (2012); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. IX); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.”).
320. See supra note 319.
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reserves all rights not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution to the people.321
Therefore, construing statutes such that they protect rights not enumerated
in the U.S. Constitution is constitutional.322
Unfortunately, rather than avoid a tough constitutional question, Justice
Powell created another horcrux in Bellotti for feudal law.323 In Bellotti,
Justice Powell appeared to invent the existence of corporate free speech in
the United States out of whole cut cloth by overruling a Massachusetts law
that restricted corporate political “speech” designed to influence the vote
on a referendum.324 However, Justice Powell’s decision was not as original
as it might seem.325
Bellotti appears to reiterate the pre-revolutionary English feudal absolute
and qualified immunity case known as The Bankers Case.326 Even as states
begin abolishing qualified immunity for police officers after George Floyd’s
death, judges may turn to Bellotti to continue the practice.327 It is unlikely
that any United States judge will remember how the Chisholm Court already
limited corporate rights by the contours of natural human rights when it
decided:

321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Compare First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (stating that
corporate free speech “is a t the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”), with Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. 419, 455–56 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (“In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned
and artificial person [i.e., corporations], we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who
think and speak and act are men.”), distinguishing and delegitimizing The Bankers Case, (1696) 14 How. St.
Tr. 1, 32 (Eng.) (establishing sovereign and qualified immunity doctrine based upon the corporate and
feudal rights of the crown).
324. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 768–770, 768 n.2, 776, overruling Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 55,
§ 8 (West Supp. 1977).
325. Compare Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–78 (overruling a state law under the First Amendment as
incorporated by the Fourteenth), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–58 (1905) (overruling a
state law under a liberty interest incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment).
326. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
327. Id.; Jacob Knutson, New Mexico eliminates qualified immunity, AXIOS (Apr. 7, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/new-mexico-qualified-immunity-police-repeal-e11fec38-94db-4419-bf67-9ae
c93eb5348.html [https://perma.cc/28EM-LXDW]; Cary Aspinwall & Simone Weichselbaum, Colorado
Tries New Way To Punish Rogue Cops, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020, 4:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/colorado-tries-new-way-to-punish-rogue-cops
[https://perma.cc/B8DA-DGBX]; cf. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437–44 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (expounding
and defending state powers through corporate/feudal law given in The Bankers Case, 14 How. St. Tr.
at 32 (establishing the feudal maxim that the king can do no wrong)); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 766 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the
President . . . is a reversion to the old notion that the King can do no wrong.”).
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[A corporation] is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests: It has
its rules: It has its rights: And it has its obligations. It may acquire property
distinct from that of its members: It may incur debts to be discharged out of
the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be
bound by contracts; and for damages arising from the breach of those
contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and
artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who
think and speak and act are men.328

The opposite idea was defended by a single dissenter, Justice Iredell, who
stoutly expounded the feudal case known as The Bankers Case, which
invented sovereign and qualified immunity upon the idea that the
corporation of the crown can do no wrong.329 Justice Powell’s defense of
the First Amendment rights of corporations was a rebirth of The Bankers
Case immunity for corporations including public government corporations
to issue all kinds of Bernaysian propaganda to manipulate the people and to
engineer their consent.330
Bernaysian strategies for securing business interests were operationalized
by Justice Powell himself in the Powell Memo, which suggested a hands-off
approach for corporations to, for example, use think tanks and grass roots
movements to shuttle in their agendas as if they were one in group of
agendas naturally arising from the people.331 In pursuit of the Powell
Memo’s political objectives, Bellotti was eventually extended in Citizens
United.332 Ever since, billionaires like the Koch brothers took Powell’s
advice, fostering mass public delusion through corporate propaganda that
they positioned as grass roots movements.333
328. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455–56 (Wilson, J.).
329. Id. at 455–56; id. at 437–44 (Iredell, J., dissenting); The Bankers Case, 14 How. St. Tr. at 32.
330. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–78; Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455–56 (noting that the crown, like the
states in America, are structured as public corporations).
331. Supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text; cf. Nicholas Freudenberg, McDomination:
How Corporations Conquered America and Ruined our Health, SALON (Feb. 23, 2014, 2:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2014/02/23/mcdomination_how_corporations_conquered_america_and_r
uined_our_health/ [https://perma.cc/F8UM-AEEY] (“Powell’s memo serves as a useful starting
point for understanding how the transformation of the corporate system that began in the 1970s set
the stage for today’s global health problems.”).
332. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–78, extended by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
333. Jeff Nesbit, The Secret Origins of the Tea Party, TIME (last visited on Apr. 2, 2022),
https://time.com/secret-origins-of-the-tea-party/ [https://perma.cc/Y9RP-96KW]; Nahal Toosi,
Koch showers millions on think tanks to push a restrained foreign policy, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2020, 1:44 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/13/charles-koch-grants-foreign-policy-think-tanks114898 [https://perma.cc/HM5M-W3FW]; see CITIZEN KOCH (Elsewhere Films 2013) (using the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

59

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

382

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:323

America was eventually softened up by big money, so much so that
longshot pro-Kremlin efforts led by shady characters like Carter Page, Maria
Butina, and others actually worked.334 Bellotti and Citizens United opened
the door for rich Americans, like Rex Tillerson and Donald Trump, to
facilitate the influence of foreign money in U.S. politics.335 With greedy
men at the helm, America no longer seemed to heed George Washington’s
clear warning “[a]gainst the insidious wiles of foreign influence.”336
As bad as this is, Justice Powell’s most concerning horcrux was his
majority opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge.337 The Mathews cost/benefit
framework traced back through Buck v. Bell and Slaughterhouse to Jeremy

Koch brothers as a case study to expound several ways rich people use corporate citizenship to corrupt
the United States, including by bankrolling the “tea party”); cf. MILLER, supra note 88, at 97–106
(explaining why people fall for delusions that are sometimes of their own making).
334. RACHEL MADDOW, BLOWOUT 207 (2019) (discussing how Carter Page was a fellow at the
Center for National Policy, a conservative nonprofit think tank, where he wrote an opinion piece
supporting links between Russia and Exxon, while criticizing “the Obama administration for imposing
‘excessive restrictions on Russian officials as see in last year’s Magnitsky Act which was reminiscent of
the blacklists of the McCarthy era’”); Valerie Hopkins, After 15 Months in U.S. Prisons, She Now Sits in
Russia’s Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/world/
europe/maria-butina-russia-duma.html [https://perma.cc/46QF-6GMD] (“Ms. Butina, who worked
before joining the Duma for RT, a government-backed television channel, frequently comments on
systemic racism in America, as pro-Kremlin figures have done for decades.”); Erik Larson &
Bloomberg, Why the Infamous Trump Tower Meeting Didn’t Take Down Trump, FORTUNE (Apr. 20, 2019,
5:28 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/20/trump-tower-meeting-mueller/ [https://perma.cc/G9
LE-ZFS3].
335. Brendan Fischer, How Citizens United Led Directly to Trump’s Impeachment, SLATE (Jan. 21,
2020, 3:13 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/01/citizens-united-john-roberts-trumpimpeachment.html [https://perma.cc/225L-2M6T]; Michael Sozan, Ending Foreign-Influenced Corporate
Spending in U.S. Elections, AMERICAN PROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.
org/article/ending-foreign-influenced-corporate-spending-u-s-elections/ [https://perma.cc/H59MKC7R] (“Citizens United . . . unleashed a torrent of spending directed at super PACs and shadowy
nonprofit organizations.”); MADDOW, supra note 334, at 358, 362.
336. GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 21 (1913) [1796]; MADDOW, supra note 334, at 358, 362; cf. Jon Schwarz, The Best Hot
Take on the Mueller Report is from 1796, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 20, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/04/20/mueller-report-george-washington-farewell-address/ [https:
//perma.cc/RDK2-KMVW]; Larson & Bloomberg, supra note 332 (“The 20-minute gathering in
Manhattan seemed to have everything: Donald Trump Jr. meeting with a Kremlin-linked lawyer.
The supposed promise of dirt on Hillary Clinton. The president personally dictating parts of a
statement that smacked of cover-up. Collusion with Russia, obstruction of justice—Robert Mueller’s
twin targets—all seemingly taking place right inside Trump’s signature landmark, just a few months
before the election. In Mueller’s final report, however, the Trump Tower meeting is little more than a
blip, just one of a host of incidents that drew his attention.”).
337. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976).
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Bentham and the Witch Judges of Massachusetts.338 In Mathews, Justice
Powell created a horcrux for puritanical legal positivism that arbitrarily
mixed feudal, canon, and common laws to horrific effect as exemplified by
Dalila’s justification for Samson’s figurative castration and death in Milton’s

338. Compare id., with John Milton, Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (containing the cost/benefit
balancing ideology the Puritans used to justify their austere systems of law: “[T]hat grounded maxim /
So rife and celebrated in the mouths / Of wisest men; that to the public good / Private respects must
yield.”). In their rush to vindicate quarantine and vaccine mandates in 2020, some researchers failed
to connect the dots completely, regarding the Puritans. See, e.g., Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes,
The Long History of Coercive Health Responses in American Law, LAWFARE (Apr. 13, 2020, 2:56 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/long-history-coercive-health-responses-american-law [https://perma.
cc/S49H-5PRS] (noting “[t]he first formal quarantine law enacted by one of the American colonies
followed in 1647, in Massachusetts,” but failing to realize that Margaret Jones, who was blamed for
this epidemic in 1647–48, was the first of the so-called witches hanged by the Puritans, because they
believed she caused the epidemic through magic); THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE
COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 150 (2d ed., 1765) (noting Margaret Jones was the first “witch” to
be hanged for having the malignant touch and that she was blamed for the epidemic of 1647–48 that
the Lawfare Blog cited above); 2 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 237 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853) (containing the first
official American quarantine law enacted in what appears to be March of 1648, though several sources
say it was enacted in 1647); Kay Schriner & Lisa A. Ochs, Creating the Disabled Citizen: How Massachusetts
Disenfranchised People under Guardianship, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 494–95 (2001) (examining the puritanical
roots of health laws in the Puritan laws of Massachusetts Bay Colony characterized by a “covenant” in
which the interests of the individual were weighed and balanced against the interests of the state, but
as God’s will was usually in favor of the state over the individual, “[t]he private interests of individuals
were insignificant by comparison and hardly merited attention”); EVE LAPLANTE, AMERICAN
JEZEBEL 149–51 (2010) [hereinafter LAPLANTE, AMERICAN] (referring to a quarantine that occurred
between 1630 and 1631 to combat the bubonic plague). It is very easy to connect the dots of the
thought process the Puritans started to Jeremy Bentham and Justice Holmes to Buck v. Bell, Mathews,
and beyond. Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–34, with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (citing
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)) (the only case Buck cited was Jacobson, which extended
Massachusetts’ cost/benefit balancing justification from pages 24–25 of Jacobson), John R.
Schmidhauser, Jeremy Bentham, the Contract Clause and Justice John Archibald Campbell, 11 VANDERBILT L.
REV. 801, 819–20 (1958) (conceptually connecting Slaughterhouse with Bentham and Holmes),
CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD’S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
171, 273 (1970) (“Jeremy Bentham five years later regretted that the English Revolution had produced
no Code Cromwell, and highly praised Oliver’s interest in law reform.”), PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY
& DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 241 (2006) (noting that the
purpose of Bentham’s legal positivism was the maximization of utility through cost/benefit balancing
tests), WOOLRYCH, supra note 123, at 271–73, 300 (noting that Cromwell and the English Puritans’
embrace of legal positivism, which arguably destroyed their country, originated in Massachusetts Bay),
and SIMMONS, supra note 191, at 22 (highlighting John Adams and James Otis’ argument that the most
likely figure to pollute England with notions of legal positivism after Cromwell used it to ruin their
country was the notorious American Puritan George Downing, who sponsored and achieved the
passage the English Navigation Acts to oppress his own countrymen in America).
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Samson Agonistes.339 This opened a door to the establishment of Star
Chambers in America for the literal castration of unwilling Americans like
Kelli Dillon, who uncovered a eugenic system in California in the 2000s and
who will be address in more depth in Parts II & III to follow.340
Mathews disrupted due process, which is the most crucial element of the
law, as it is a master switch that affects potentially every law and right in
relation to government power.341 Perhaps the most striking indication of
Powell’s success is that for decades liberals broadly endorsed Mathews when
it is directly antithetical to their interests.342 The Mathews horcrux, being
the most successful of Powell’s three horcruxes, will receive special focus in
Part II to follow.343

339. John Milton, Samson Agonistes 865–68 [1671] (“[T]hat grounded maxim / So rife and
celebrated in the mouths / Of wisest men; that to the public good / Private respects must yield.”).
Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–34 (“Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative
procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and
private interests that are affected.”), extended by Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 340 (2014)
(“So experience, as far as anyone has discerned it, cuts against the Kaleys: It confirms that even under
Mathews, they have no right to revisit the grand jury’s finding.”), with Schriner & Ochs, supra note 322,
at 495 (describing Puritanical legal positivism’s role in facilitating colonial determinations that state
interests “had to be above the self-interested pursuits of individuals” such that the cost/benefit balance
always seemed to tip in favor of strong state action), and Woolrych, supra note 123, at 271–73, 300.
Cf. Holmes, Jr., supra note 27, at 1, 312 (expounding the version of “experience” that Justice Kagan
applied in a Mathews framework to decide Kaley: “The distinctions of the law are founded on experience,
not on logic.”); Catharine Pierce Wells, Oliver Wendell Holmes: A Willing Servant to an Unknown
God 83–90 (2020) (Holmes “was deeply embedded in a Puritan culture”).
340. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (explaining how cost/benefit
balancing tests were used to castrate women in California prisons in the 2000s).
341. See Miccio, supra note 65, at 296–97 (defending a proposed collapse of “both the
distinction between substantive and procedural, and the categories under a rubric of ‘natural’ rights”).
342. See Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas Court: Why Boumediene
v. Bush is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 THE HARBINGER 46, 51–52 n.13 (2021) (explaining how
cost/benefit balancing tests are used by conservative judges to “bypass liberal criticism”); id. at 56.
Compare Kaley, 571 U.S. at 340, and Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982
(2020) (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)) (applying a Mathews balancing test),
with Margulies, supra note 152, at 446.
343. There are several sources that celebrate and expound the particular significance of Mathews
in the due process decisions of the present era. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen:
A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 881, 885 (2015).
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CONCLUSION OF THE DARK SIDE OF DUE PROCESS: PART I
The Dark Side of Due Process: Part I covered Justice Holmes’ problematic
interpretation of due process and his strategy of using opposites to draw
bright-line rules. It also explained how Justices Holmes and Brandeis
established the origins of penumbral rights and cost/benefit balancing tests
in Buck and Olmstead. Finally, it explained how Justice Powell used Holmes’
strategies to extend Holmes and Brandeis’ penumbral rights and
cost/benefit balancing tests into the present era of legal jurisprudence.
In The Dark Side of Due Process: Part II, this series will take several steps
deeper into the dark chasms of Justices Holmes and Brandeis’ due process
ideology, by discussing the quandaries caused by their positions in presentday court including the recent use of the shadow docket to nullify Roe v.
Wade.
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